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ARTICLES
RESTORING THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

Randolph N. Jonakait*
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the sixth amendment's confrontation clause' and out-of-court statements by absent declarants is a difficult one.2 Before 1980, the Supreme Court
*
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1. The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. "One of the most difficult and perplexing issues arising under the sixth
amendment is the relationship between the confrontation clause and the law of
hearsay." Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional
Unavailability,Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665, 665 (1986); see also Lilly, Notes on
the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 207 (1984)
("An intractable problem in criminal trials is to reconcile the accused's constitutional right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him' with the government's invocation of various exceptions to the rule against hearsay.").
The Court has said that its confrontation "cases fall into two broad categories: cases involving the admission of out-of-court statements and cases involving
restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985). This Article addresses the
first category.
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produced no comprehensive theory to explain the relationship. Then, in Ohio v. Roberts,3 the Court provided a general
approach for determining when out-of-court statements
could be admitted against criminal defendants without violating the confrontation clause. This framework was immediately controversial, with commentators suggesting that it
not be taken seriously. Perhaps hearing the critics, the
Court has recently abandoned at least part of the Roberts
framework.
This Article will examine these recent decisions and
others to show that the confrontation clause is now interpreted in a fundamentally different fashion from other guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The confrontation clause is no
longer a constitutional right protecting the accused, but essentially a minor adjunct to evidence law. The Article will
discuss how the provision's meaninglessness results from
the Supreme Court's misidentification of confrontation's
central mission, which thereby gives the constitutional provision the same goal as evidence law. Instead, as the Article
will demonstrate, the confrontation clause's true purpose is
to work in conjunction with other sixth amendment rights to
preserve our adversary system. The Article then develops a
standard for interpreting the confrontation clause consistent
with its purpose.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

A.

The Approach in Ohio v. Roberts

Before 1980, the Court's confrontation opinions did
fit into a coherent theory. 4 Furthermore, commentators
not agree on the proper approach to interpreting
clause.5 Then Ohio v. Roberts announced that "a general

not
did
the
ap-

3. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
4. "Since 1965, when the Supreme Court held the confrontation clause applicable to the states, the Court has applied the clause in a variety of contexts.
The resulting interpretations are not easily reconciled." Lilly, supra note 2, at 217
(footnotes omitted). Professor Lilly gives a good short description of the cases
predating Roberts. Id. at 217-21; see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 670-77, for
a description of most of the cases before Roberts.
5. Ohio v. Roberts noted the diversity of the comments.
The complexity of reconciling the Confrontation Clause and the

hearsay rules has triggered an outpouring of scholarly commen-
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proach to the problem is discernible."-6 The Court extracted
from its prior opinions two principles: the confrontation
clause contains a necessity rule that normally requires the
production or unavailability of hearsay declarants and a reliability rule that requires hearsay from absent declarants to
have marks of trustworthiness. The Court summarized:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia
of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in
a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be
excluded, at least absent a showing
of particularized
7
guarantees of trustworthiness.
This general framework, discerned but a few years ago,
has not lasted. Recent decisions indicate that the reliability
branch survives, but the general unavailability requirement
has been jettisoned.

B.

The Reliability Requirement

Two recent Supreme Court cases reaffirm the reliability
prong of Roberts. In Lee v. Illinois,8 Lee and Thomas were
tried jointly in a nonjury trial for homicide. Thomas did not
testify, but his confession was introduced against him. The
trial judge, however, expressly relied upon Thomas's confession in convicting Lee. The Supreme Court held that this
use of hearsay violated Lee's confrontation rights because
the hearsay did not have sufficient indicia of reliability, as
tary....

Some have advanced theories that would shift the general

mode of analysis in favor of the criminal defendant....
Others have advanced theories that would relax constitutional
restrictions on the use of hearsay by the prosecutor ...
Still others have proposed theories that might either help or
hurt the accused ...
Finally, a number of commentators, while sometimes criticizing
particular results or language in past decisions, have generally
agreed with the Court's present approach.
448 U.S. at 66-67 n.9. See also Lilly, supra note 2, at 215-17, and Kirkpatrick,
supra note 2, at 677-82, for discussions of differing scholarly confrontation
interpretations.
6. 448 U.S. at 65.
7. Id. at 66. The Court went on to hold that a declarant is unavailable for
confrontation purposes when the prosecutor has made a good faith effort to produce the declarant at trial. Id. at 74.
8. 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
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defined by Roberts, to justify its admission without cross-examination. 9 The four-Justice dissent agreed that the case
was governed by Ohio v. Roberts,' 0 but concluded that the
confession had sufficient indicia of reliability to pass constitutional muster. " In essence, then, while differing over application of the requirement, all the Justices agreed that
hearsay must have certain marks of trustworthiness to satisfy
the sixth amendment.
A year later, Bourjaily v. United States 12 further reaffirmed
Roberts's reliability branch. In ruling that coconspirator
statements had been constitutionally admitted against the
defendant, the Court, citing Roberts, held that such declarations could be considered reliable because they fell within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. Therefore, no independent
inquiry into the specific reliability of the admitted statements
3
was necessary to satisfy the sixth amendment.'
Thus, the reliability prong of Roberts remains alive.
Hearsay from absent declarants must be reliable, but hearsay admitted through the normal hearsay exceptions is automatically considered reliable enough to satisfy the con4
frontation clause. '
9. Id. at 2065.

10. Id. at 2066 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
It. Id. at 2071.
12. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
13. [W]e concluded in Roberts that no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence "falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception." . . . We think that the co-conspirator exception

to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in ourjurisprudence that,
under this Court's holding in Roberts, a court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements. .

.

. Accord-

ingly, we hold that the Confrontation Clause does not require a
court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of
statements that satisfy the requirements of the co-conspirator
exception.
Id. at 2782-83.
14. Lee v. Illinois held that hearsay not falling within a firmly rooted exception
is "presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes,
[but] may nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause reliability standards if it is supported by a 'showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' " 106 S. Ct.
at 2064 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
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The Unavailability Requirement

In contrast to the Supreme Court reaffirmation of
Roberts's reliability prong, United States v. Inadi 15 effectively
abandoned Roberts's unavailability branch. Inadi held that
coconspirator statements of a nontestifying declarant can be
admitted without a showing of unavailability.16 The logic of
this case, if applied to other hearsay areas, indicates that outof-court statements generally can be constitutionally introduced without producing an available declarant.
The first step in forsaking the general unavailability requirement was to limit Roberts to its specifics, that is, to former testimony.' 7 After deciding that it was not bound by the
earlier case, the Inadi Court then wove together three
strands of reasoning to reach its conclusion that the out-ofcourt statements of the available coconspirator could be admitted even if he did not testify.
The first strand was the Court's explanation of Roberts,
as now limited. Inadi concluded that former testimony
seldom has independent evidentiary significance of its
own, but is intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is available and the same information can be
presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony,
with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view
the demeanor of the declarant, there is little justification
for relying on the weaker version. 18
The Court continued that confrontation principles favor
admitting the better evidence. 19 Thus, if the declarant is
available, his former testimony cannot be introduced; if he is
unavailable, his prior testimony can be admitted since there
20
is no better version of the evidence.
15. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
16. Id. at 1129.

17.

Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to questions not

Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding
presented in that case ....
rule . . . that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony. ...
Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that
no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government
without a showing that the declarant is unavailable.
Id. at 1125-26.
18. Id. at 1126.
19. "When two versions of the same evidence are available, longstanding
principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better evidence." Id.
20. Id.
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Live testimony, however, is not better than coconspirator hearsay, according to Inadi.
Because they are made while the conspiracy is in progress, such statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the
declarant testifies to the same matters in court ...
[C]oconspirator statements derive much of their value
from the fact that they are made in a context very different from trial, and therefore
are usually irreplaceable as
21
substantive evidence.
Since this hearsay has more evidentiary value than live
testimony, or at least has a different kind of value, its admission without requiring unavailability of the declarant does
not conflict with the better evidence principle of the confrontation clause.
This reasoning, however, distinguishes more than just
prior testimony from coconspirator statements; it distinguishes former testimony from all other admitted hearsay as
well. Former testimony is exempted from the general prohibition on hearsay because it incorporates cross-examination
and can, therefore, be evaluated nearly as well by the trier of

fact as can in-court testimony.22 Other hearsay is exempted,
however, because the circumstances in which it was uttered
make that class of hearsay more reliable than hearsay generally. 23 The evidentiary value of all the other admitted hear-

say depends on the context in which it was made. Just as incourt testimony is not a replacement for coconspirator statements, neither is it a replacement for any admissible hearsay,
except for former testimony. 24 A glance at a few of the frequently utilized hearsay exceptions illustrates this point.
The person who witnesses a robbery can testify at trial
that the robber was his neighbor. That testimony is not
merely a substitute for his excited utterance during the
21. Id. at 1126-27.
22. See Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and GrandJury Testimony, 36 CASE
W. RES. 431, 466 (1985).
23. See id. at 467-78.
24. The Inadi Court also distinguished former testimony and coconspirator
statements by stating: "Roberts and our other prior testimony cases ... rested inpart on the strong similarities between the prior judicial proceedings and the trial.

No such strong similarities exist between coconspirator statements and live testimony at trial." 106 S. Ct. at 1127. This, too, sets former testimony off from the
rest of admissible hearsay.
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crime, "That's my neighbor!"-2 5 The jury may feel that the
context of the hearsay declaration gives that statement a
weight and reliability different from the weight of trial testimony.2 6 Similarly, the bank official may testify from his
memory that a defendant withdrew money. The business
record of that transaction, however, has a different evidentiary value from the testimony. 2 7 Because of the context in
which that hearsay was made, that is, because the record was
entered in the routine course of business at the time of withdrawal, the jury may easily consider the business record of
much greater value than the in-court testimony. 28
This portion of the Court's reasoning essentially divides
the hearsay exceptions into two categories-former testimony and all the rest. With such a division, the confrontation clause actually offers an accused less protection than
does normal hearsay doctrine.
Under evidentiary law there are also two divisions for
the hearsay exceptions, but they are different from the divisions indicated by Inadi. One group, which can be called the
Rule 803 exceptions, allows the admission of hearsay
whether or not the declarant is available. 29 The other
group, the Rule 804 exceptions, only allows the out-of-court
statements to be admitted if the declarant is unavailable. 30
Except for former testimony, the Rule 804 exceptions, like
25. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
26. If the jury accepts the rationale for the hearsay exception, that the exciting
event stilled the declarant's powers of reflection and fabrication, see FED. R. EVID.
803(2) advisory committee's note, it will give the hearsay evidence a different
weight than the in-court testimony. Cf MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 297, at 855
(E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (The rationale for the exception "also serves to justify
dispensing with any requirement that the declarant be unavailable, because it suggests that his testimony on the stand, given at a time when his powers of reflection
and fabrication are operative, is at least no more reliable than his out-of-court
statement.").
27. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
28. Once again, if the jury accepts the rationale for the business record exception and concludes that such documents have "unusual reliability," see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 26, § 306, at 872, the in-court testimony will not be
a mere substitution for the hearsay.
29. See FED. R. EvID. 803.

30. See FED. R. EvID. 804. Coconspirator statements do not fall under either
Rules 803 or 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Instead, although such statements meet the basic definition of hearsay, see FED. R. EvID. H801(c), they are
specifically excluded from the definition. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). At common
law, these declarations are considered hearsay, but a hearsay exception allows
their admission. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE

564

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:557

coconspirator statements, really get their evidentiary value
from the context in which they were uttered. 3' Under Inadi's analysis, they are not replaceable by live testimony. For
example, a statement against interest is made in a context
quite different from a trial and has force because its setting
indicates that it was against the declarant's interest when
uttered. 32 The setting tends to insure the hearsay's reliability and gives the statement a different weight than would be
given to the same words uttered by the same person on the
witness stand. 33 In the Court's terms, live testimony is not
better evidence than statements against interest, but is evidence of a different substantive worth. If the logic of Inadi is
applied to this exception, the confrontation clause does not
require the unavailability of the declarant who makes a statement against interest, even though evidentiary law does
require this unavailability. If there is an unavailability protection, it comes solely from evidence law.
Inadi's second strand of reasoning concluding that the
sixth amendment does not require the unavailability of the
declarant before admitting coconspirator statements was
that such a rule would not offer any significant benefit. Since
such a requirement does not forbid out-of-court statements
if the declarant is truly unavailable, it would not actually exclude any evidence "unless the prosecution makes the mis34
take of not producing an otherwise available witness."
Moreover, the Court continued, an unavailability rule would
not produce much of an increase in worthwhile testimony. If
the defendant really wanted the declarant to testify, he could
have used his rights under the sixth amendment compulsory
clause and produced the declarant. If the defendant chooses
383-86 (2d ed. 1982). Under either scheme, the hearsay is admissible without a
showing of the declarant's unavailability.
31. See Jonakait, supra note 22, at 467-70.
32. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
33. The exception exists because of the "assumption that persons do not
make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note. This
assumption is "premised upon the declarant's recognizing the disserving nature
of his statement at the time he made it." Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The
Development, Application, and Unconstitutionalityof Rule 804(b)(3) 's Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851, 907 (1981). If the jury accepts these assumptions, they

ought to give the hearsay a different weight than the declarant's in-court
testimony.
34. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1127.
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not to force the declarant to testify, the Court reasoned,
"then it is difficult to see what, if anything, is gained by a
rule that requires the prosecution to make that declarant
'available.' -35
Once again, this reasoning applies not just to coconspirator statements, but to all admitted hearsay, including
the Rule 804 exceptions. If this logic controls, then the confrontation clause should not require the unavailability of declarants even for Rule 804 exceptions. Inadi again indicates
that the confrontation clause gives an accused less protection than traditional hearsay doctrine.
Finally, Inadi cited the burdens from an unavailability
rule as its third reason for rejecting such a rule. The burdens would be of two kinds. First, the prosecution would
have practical difficulties in "identify[ing] with specificity
each declarant, locat[ing] those declarant[s], and then endeavor[ing] to ensure their continuing availability for
trial." 36 Second, since evidentiary law does not require unavailability for coconspirator declarations, a sixth amendment unavailability rule for such statements would require
trial courts to make deisions they are not now making and
thereby give defendants a possible additional appellate
claim. These new avenues of litigation "would impose a
substantial burden on the entire criminal justice system." 3 7
A constitutional unavailability requirement, however,
only imposes a substantial burden on prosecutors and courts
when an unavailability rule is not already in place. Evidence
law already demands that Rule 804 declarants be unavailable
before the hearsay is admitted and requires the prosecutor
to produce available Rule 804 declarants. If the prosecutor
seeks to have the statements admitted, the court already has
to decide if the declarant was truly unavailable. A sixth
amendment unavailability requirement for this hearsay
causes little additional work. 38 Such a requisite burdens the
courts and government only if the confrontation clause were
35. Id. at 1128.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. An unavailability requirement for Rule 804 declarants, while not increasing the work of the state trial and appellate courts, will increase the burden on
federal courts. If an unavailability requirement is constitutionally mandated, state
prisoners will be able to raise federal habeas corpus claims about state availability
rulings.
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found to require unavailability when evidence law does not
already require it. Only then would the officials have to do
something they do not already do. Consequently, if Inadi's
concerns about the burdens imposed by the requirement are
controlling, the confrontation clause might impose an unavailability requirement for Rule 804 declarants, but not for
any other out-of-court declarants.
This last strand of Inadi's logic appears to leave the status of the constitutional unavailability requirement unclear.
The opinion accepts Roberts's conclusion that the confrontation clause requires proof of unavailability before prior testimony can be admitted. It then gives two reasons that
indicate that an unavailability requirement should be limited
solely to former testimony: one, that in-court testimony is
not a substitute for coconspirator statements and two, that
an unavailability requirement would not produce important
benefits because the defendant can produce the declarant.
The Court's third reason, however, expressing a concern
with the burdens of an unavailability rule could lead to an
unavailability requirement for all Rule 804 hearsay. Nothing
in the decision, however, indicates that this third reason
should be given primacy. It is just one justification of the
several the Court gives. Indeed, if the Court later finds that
confrontation requires the unavailability of Rule 804 declarants, that decision will not really be the result of sixth
amendment analysis, but of evidence law.
The burden the Court is concerned about only exists if
evidence law does not now impose an unavailability requirement.3 9 This means that if a legislature should do away with
the requirement for a Rule 804 exception, such as declarations against interest, the confrontation clause, if it had imposed an unavailability requirement for such hearsay, should
no longer do so. All three strands of Inadi's reasoning would
now apply: such statements have a different weight in context than courtroom testimony; the accused can always pro39. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 674.
In cases where the prosecutor is already required to show unavailability under controlling evidence rules, there may be little or no additional burden involved in satisfying constitutional standards of
unavailability. It is, however, a substantial additional burden for
prosecutors to show unavailability when no such showing is otherwise required.
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duce the declarant if the testimony is truly important; and
additional burdens will be placed on the criminal justice system by the constitutional imposition of a rule not required
by evidence law.
The extent of the unavailability requirement left by Inadi, then, hardly matters. Either evidence law will give an
accused more protection than the sixth amendment offers by
requiring unavailability when the amendment does not, or
the confrontation clause will require unavailability for former testimony and for the hearsay rules that already require
unavailability. Confrontation will never demand it when evidence law does not. A defendant, therefore, should look not
to the confrontation clause for protection, but to evidence
0
law .4
This result should not be surprising. The Court has asserted that the values protected by the hearsay rule and the
confrontation clause are similar, but the overlap is not complete. 4 1 The logical implication, however, that the confron-

tation clause bars some statements admitted under hearsay
doctrine has not been put into effect. 42 The modern Court
has found the admission of hearsay to be a constitutional violation only when the prosecution has not made a good faith
effort to produce a declarant when the evidence rules already require the declarant's unavailability. 43 No other
40. "[T]he rationale underlying the Inadi decision strongly suggests that the
Court is willing to allow the Federal Rules of Evidence to define the scope of
confrontation rights." Comment, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule' A
Problematic Relationship in Need of a PracticalAnalysis, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 949, 971
(1987).
41. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970); see also Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary rule stem from the same roots. But this Court
has never equated the two ....
); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
42. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's note ("In recognition
of the separateness of the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule, and to avoid
inviting collisions between them ....
the exceptions set forth in Rules 803 and
804 are stated in terms of exemption from the general exclusionary mandate of
the hearsay rule, rather than in positive terms of admissibility."); see also Note,
Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 159, 162 (1983) ("The extent of congruence between the hearsay rule and
the confrontation clause is not entirely clear. Though the constitutional requirement does not bar all out-of-court statements by an unavailable declarant, not
every exception to the hearsay rule will necessarily be an exception to the confrontation clause.").
43. Thus, in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), prior testimony was admitted against the accused. The trial court decided that the declarant was unavailable
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hearsay properly admitted under the applicable evidence law
has been found to violate the confrontation provision. 44 In
other words, twenty years of confrontation analysis have
because he was incarcerated in a federal prison in another state. The Supreme
Court found a confrontation violation and held that the declarant was not unavailable unless the state had made a good faith effort to produce him. The state had
not made such an effort. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the first decision
applying the confrontation clause to the states and the first modern Supreme
Court case interpreting the clause, might be the exceptional case that found a
sixth amendment violation on some ground other than availability for evidence
validly admitted under the applicable evidence law. Pointerheld that the introduction of preliminary hearing testimony violated the confrontation clause. The defendant was not represented by counsel at the hearing, and the defendant did not
cross-examine. The prior testimony was admitted at trial apparently without a
showing that good faith efforts were made to produce the declarant. The Court's
holding could have several bases, including the fact that the accused was without
counsel at the preliminary hearing or that the defendant did not cross-examine at
the hearing. See Younger, Confrontation, 24 WASH13URN L.J. 1, 2-4 (1984) (discussion of possible Pointerrationales). Today, however, the Court sees Pointer as simply an unavailability case. See United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (1986)
("Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule, foreshadowed in Pointer v. Texas,
. . and refined in a line of cases up through Roberts, that applies unavailability
analysis to prior testimony.").
An earlier case did find that the admission of hearsay in compliance with
hearsay rules violated the confrontation clause on grounds other than that a good
faith effort had not been made to produce the declarant. See Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (during trial for receipt of stolen goods, confrontation
violation to prove goods were stolen by introduction of records of convictions of
the three men convicted in a separate trial of stealing goods).
44. In other cases where the Court found confrontation violations because of
the use of out-of-court statements at trial, the statements were not introduced
against the defendant in accordance with the appropriate evidence law. See Cruz
v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987) (confrontation violation to introduce nontestifying codefendant's confession in joint trial with an instruction that the confession should only be considered against codefendant even though defendant's
interlocking confession also introduced); Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986)
(confrontation violation to consider nontestifying codefendant's confession when
confession only introduced against codefendant in joint trial); Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (Bruton's confrontation rights violated by introduction of nontestifying codefendant's confession in joint trial where jury instructed
to consider confession only against codefendant); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415 (1965) (confrontation violation where memory of prosecution witness was
"refreshed" by reading his confession in front of jury after witness asserted fifth
amendment privilege and refused to testify).
The Court has found no constitutional violation in the admission of evidence
whose introduction would have violated traditional evidence rules, but did not
violate the expansive evidence rules of the state where the trial was conducted. See
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (admission of coconspirator statements made
during concealment phase did not violate the sixth amendment); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (substantive admission of prior inconsistent statements did not violate confrontation clause); see aLbo Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct.
at 1719 (indicating that a nontestifying codefendant's confession could be used
against the defendant if the hearsay has sufficient indicia of reliability).
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merely produced a slight redefinition of "unavailability." In
reality, the conflicts between the hearsay exceptions and the
sixth amendment have all been resolved, as they were in In45
adi, in favor of the exceptions.

Indeed, much of the modern debate about confrontation has assumed that if an interpretation of the confrontation clause conflicts with the evidence rules, then that
constitutional interpretation must be wrong. This assumption was especially true in analyses of the unavailability
prong of Roberts, which prompted strong, but singular, criticism. An unavailability requirement was wrong, according
to these analyses, not because it violated the Framers' intent;4 6 not because it was out of step with interpretations of
other constitutional provisions; and not because it ignored
the language of the confrontation clause. The requirement
was wrong simply because it would have worked a change in
the hearsay exceptions. This constitutional interpretation
must be discarded, came the unusual cry, because it con47
flicted with modern evidence law.

45. Although Lee found a confrontation violation, it too falls within this pattern. Lee had a joint, nonjury trial with her codefendant. She withdrew her motion for a separate trial after the judge agreed to consider the evidence against
each defendant separately. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S.Ct. at 2060. In spite of the trial
judge's statement, and even though the codefendant's confession was not introduced against Lee, the trial judge expressly relied upon the codefendant's confession in finding Lee guilty of murder. Although the Supreme Court held that the
confrontation clause was violated because the confession was not reliable enough
to be used as substantive evidence, the Court did not find that evidence admitted
under normal evidence rules was too unreliable to pass the sixth amendment.
The Court has never found any evidence admitted under any hearsay exception to
so lack the indicia of reliability as to be unconstitutional.
46. Courts and commentators agree that history teaches little about the Framers' intentions for the clause. See, e.g., Read, The New Confrontation-HearsayDilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1972) ("The exact intent of the framers of the

Constitution in providing [the confrontation clause] is probably undiscoverable."); Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the CoconspiratorExemption from the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1294,

1301 (1985) ("Traditional sources of constitutional history shed little light on the
intent of the framers of the sixth amendment.... Therefore .... any determination of whether a given aspect of the hearsay rule satisfies the confrontation clause
must be preceded by an examination of the theory and policies underlying the
constitutional right.").
See Lilly, supra note 2, at 208-15, for a discussion of this history. It does
seem clear, however, that at the time of the clause's adoption, the admission of
hearsay was strictly circumscribed. Id. at 212-13.
47. See, e.g., R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 30, at 593 ("This statement, if taken literally, would work a dramatic change in the way criminal cases are
tried. It would mean that all hearsay exceptions in criminal cases require unavail-
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The Inadi Court heard these contentions. It recognized
that if the Roberts opinion truly controlled hearsay, "a wholesale revision of the law of evidence" would result. 48 Apparently the Court considered it more important to change that
constitutional interpretation than to change evidence law.
Thus, the Court simply disowned the part of Roberts's general framework that conflicted with hearsay doctrine: "Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition
that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable. "49
D.

The Confrontation Clause as a Mere Rule of Evidence

Although composed of different majorities and reaching
different results, the recent cases of Lee, Inadi, and Bourjaily
are consistent at a fundamental level. Each fits perfectly into
the modern debate about confrontation, which is concerned
with finding the best evidence rules to apply in a criminal
case rather than addressing the content of the confrontation
ability. .

.

. It is hard to believe that the Court meant to go this far."); see also J.

FRIEDENTHALER & M. SINGER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

135-36 (1985):

It is unlikely that the Supreme Court meant this statement to apply
to the whole range of hearsay utterances. It is, for example, not considered necessary, before introducing medical treatise evidence
against an accused in a trial for murder by poisoning, to show that
the writer of the treatise is unavailable .... [I]t seems reasonable to
assume that the Court was referring to [former hearing] testimony
and other evidence within the scope of Rule 804.
See also M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 290
n.6 (1983):
This quotation contains the disturbing indication that a hearsay
statement falling within a hearsay exception contained in Rule 803
may be admitted against the criminal defendant in the normal case
only if the government produces the declarant .... Taken literally,
all hearsay exceptions in Rule 803 would require a showing of unavailability or the production of an available declarant when offered
against the accused.
Several factors indicate that the Supreme Court had no such intention in mind.
Accord Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 667-68.
48. 106 S. Ct. at 1125.
49. Id. at 1126; cf Note, supra note 46, at 1299-1300, written shortly before
Inadi was decided ("The circuits.., are divided over the need for an unavailability
requirement, despite Roberts's explicit command that prosecutors either produce
out-of-court declarants or demonstrate their unavailability .... Most circuits do
require proof of unavailability prior to the admission of coconspirator
statements.").
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clause. In reality, evidence rules set the boundaries for the
argument, and evidentiary principles control the content of
the confrontation clause.
Thus, the Court has concluded that if a statement does
not fall within the traditional definition of hearsay, it does
not present a confrontation problem. 5 0 This means that the
sixth amendment contains a hearsay definition. The Court,
however, has not struggled to determine the proper definition. Instead, the Court has simply placed the notion of
hearsay found in evidence law into the Constitution.51 In
other words, to know the boundaries of this part of his con50. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985), indicates that if an out-of-court
statement does not meet a traditional definition of hearsay, it can be admitted
without violating the confrontation clause. In Street, a codefendant's confession
was read to the jury to rebut the defendant's claim that the defendant's confession
had been coerced and derived from the codefendant's statement. The Court
stressed that "the prosecutor did not introduce Peele's out-of-court confession to
prove the truth of Peele's assertion. Thus ....
Peele's confession was not hearsay
under traditional rules of evidence." Id. at 413 (emphasis in original). The Court
concluded, "The nonhearsay aspect of Peele's confession-not to prove what happened at the murder scene but to prove what happened when respondent confessed-raises no Confrontation Clause concerns." Id. at 414 (emphasis in
original).
A year later, the Court made more explicit its implication that a statement not
falling within the traditional boundaries of hearsay cannot violate the confrontation clause. "[Mlany coconspirator statements are not introduced to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, and thus do not come within the traditional definition
of hearsay .... We explained just last Term that admission of nonhearsay 'raises
no Confrontation Clause concerns.' Tennessee v. Street, 105 S. Ct. at 2081." United
States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1128 n.l 1 (1986); cf. Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct.
1714, 1717 (1987) ("Ordinarily, a witness is considered to be a witness 'against' a
defendant for purposes of the Confrontation Clause only if his testimony is part of
the body of evidence that the jury may consider in assessing his guilt.").
Lower courts have equated hearsay and confrontation analysis to the extent
that courts apply a confrontation analysis to determine whether the accused may
introduce hearsay. See, e.g., United States v. Harenberg, 732 F.2d 1507. 1515
(10th Cir. 1984).
51. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 n.4 (1986) (quoting E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 584 (2d ed. 1972)), stated,
We have previously turned to McCormick's definition of hearsay as
"testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of
court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth
of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter."
Evidence law, however, does not unanimously accept this or any other definition.
"Nearly every important scholar in the field of evidence, and many a lesser one,
has written on the problem of the scope of the hearsay rule." Wellborn, The Deftnition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEX. L. REV. 49, 58 (1982).
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look not to constitulaw.
required by the conpattern-the accused
if he has a confronta-

tion right. Bourjaily v. United States reaffirms the rule that no

showing is necessary to establish a statement's reliability
other than proof that the hearsay falls within a normal exception. 52 Thus, the accused can only expect constitutional
protection against unconfronted statements when the evidence does not fall into one of the numerous accepted hearsay exceptions.

Of course, if the out-of-court statement

does not fall into such a category, it would normally be
banned by the hearsay rule. In other words, the absence of a
hearsay exception rather than the existence of the sixth
amendment, protects the accused. If the evidence law does
not give protection, that is, if a hearsay exception exists for
the unconfronted declaration, then the confrontation clause
also denies protection. 53 Once again, the accused should
52. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. The drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence did not justify the exemption of coconspirator statements from
the hearsay prohibition on the grounds of reliability. "Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of
the conditions of the hearsay rule .... No guarantee of trustworthiness is required
in the case of an admission." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note;
see also Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the CoconspiratorException in Criminal
Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1384 (1972) ("the co-

conspirator exception has usually been supported by a variety of theories unrelated to the trustworthiness of the evidence itself."). Cf Mueller, The Federal
Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323

(1984). "[M]odern commentators have suggested that the [coconspirator] exception exists largely because it is necessary as a means of convicting conspirators.
Since conspiracies are dangerous to society and hard to prove at trial, a relaxation
of the hearsay doctrine is required. Courts occasionally find something in this
view." Id. at 335 (footnotes omitted). Mueller goes on to recommend that the
Federal Rules of Evidence include a specific trustworthiness requirement for
coconspirator statements. Id. at 388.
If a reliability inquiry is not necessary for coconspirator statements, which do
not have a reliability justification, then such an inquiry will be unnecessary for all
other firmly rooted hearsay exceptions.
53. Although Bourjaily states that confrontation "does not require" an independent reliability inquiry for firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, the holding really indicates that no such inquiry should be done. The Court's analysis consisted
solely of determining that the hearsay fell within an appropriate hearsay exception. That, of course, is all that any future court should have to do. Thus, for
example, the analysis done in Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984), was unnecessary. There, where the defendant
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look not to constitutional interpretation for the limits of his
confrontation rights, but to evidence law.
Even if the evidence is not admissible under normal notions of the hearsay doctrine, it still passes sixth amendment
scrutiny with a showing of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."

54

The Court has not explicated

that

term.55 "Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,"
however, bears striking resemblance to modern evidence
law's residual hearsay exceptions which permit the admission of hearsay not falling into any traditional exception if
the hearsay has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness . . . " equivalent to the guarantees for hearsay admitted
under the other exceptions. 56 Roberts's language seems

designed to guarantee that if hearsay is properly admitted
under a residual exception, it will not violate the confrontation clause. 57 If the accused wins his evidentiary objection
that the evidence does not fall within a residual exception,
no constitutional analysis will be necessary. If he loses the
hearsay objection, the evidence will be reliable enough for
confrontation purposes. Once again, the accused should
look to evidence law for the content of his right, not to the
Constitution.
The confrontation clause's reliability prong will truly
provide protection only if evidence gets "admitted" in violation of evidentiary doctrine. In other words, only when evidence law does not give an accused adequate protection
against illegally admitted hearsay will a constitutional reliability analysis matter. That, of course, was the situation in
Lee. 58 Although codefendant Thomas's confession was propwas accused of leaving the scene of an accident, the statements made shortly after
the accident by an unidentified person that the driver looked like the defendant
were admitted under the state's res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. The court
of appeals found this exception to be a firmly rooted one, id. at 1494 n.3, but the
court went on to undertake a separate reliability inquiry. It concluded that Roberts's language about firmly rooted exceptions was merely dicta. Id. at 1495.
54. See supra note 14.

55. In Lee v. Illinois, the majority rejected the state's proffered reasons for
why the hearsay had sufficient trustworthiness guarantees without explaining what
might satisfy that term. 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2064-65(1986).
56. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
57. See Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the FederalHearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867, 898 (1982) ("satisfaction of the

residual exceptions amounts to satisfaction of the confrontation clause.").
58. 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
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erly admitted against him, the hearsay was not legally admitted against Lee in the joint bench trial. Even so, the judge
used the confession to convict Lee. Although the Supreme
Court relied upon the reliability prong to find a confrontation clause violation, if evidence law had been properly applied, the confession would not have affected Lee's verdict
and the Court would not have had to undertake any reliability analysis.
Only in such rare, Lee-like, situations does confrontation's reliability principle matter. Even then, however, the
principle may have an insignificant effect, for hearsay inadmissible under evidence rules may still be used at trial without violating the sixth amendment. Thus, in Lee, even
though the hearsay was not admissible against the defendant, the Supreme Court undertook its own reliability review.
While the majority held that on the specifics of the case the
out-of-court statements were not trustworthy enough to satisfy the confrontation clause, the fact of the reliability review
itself indicates that hearsay not admissible under well-established evidence law can still be introduced without violating
confrontation principles; otherwise the Court did not have
59
to bother with the trustworthiness determination it made.
Once again, the accused should look to evidence law, not the
sixth amendment, for protection.
II.
A.

THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Confrontation'sMission

The confrontation clause is not now a constitutional
provision controlling evidence law. Instead, evidence law
dominates the confrontation right. The Court uses evidence
59. By finding that the codefendant's confession was constitutionally reliable,
the four dissenters expressly indicated that "Itis the unusual conjunction of these
indicia of reliability ...that persuades me in this case that the defacto admission of
the confession of an unavailable witness as substantive evidence against petitioner
did not violate the Confrontation Clause." 106 S. Ct. at 2071 (BlackmunJ., dissenting); see also Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), where the Court held
that the confrontation clause was violated by introducing in a joint trial the nontestifying codefendant's confession implicating the defendant even though a limiting instruction was given and even though the defendant's own confession was
introduced. The Court then went on to state: "Of course, the defendant's confession may be considered at trial in assessing whether his codefendant's statements
are supported by sufficient 'indicia of reliability' to be directly admissible against
him ..... Id. at 1719.
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law's definition of hearsay to determine when the confrontation clause is implicated. It has adopted an unavailability
rule that offers no protection in addition to that provided by
evidence law, except in the case of former testimony. It has
chosen a reliability test that cedes superiority to hearsay doctrine. As a result, the confrontation clause is nearly useless.
It is not really a constitutional right, interpreted like other
fundamental guarantees, but a mere vestigial appendix of
6
hearsay doctrine. 0
There may be many reasons why the Court has interpreted the confrontation clause so that it offers fewer protections than the evidence rules. The outcomes may simply
reflect the desire of the Court's majorities to restrict the
rights of the accused. One important reason for the present
interpretation, however, comes from the Court's misunderstanding of the basic purposes of the confrontation clause. 6'
60. The primacy of evidence law over the confrontation clause is also seen in
academic circles where only evidence scholars seem concerned with the provision.
[I]t is now pursued solely by evidence specialists, and is viewed as
the last section in the discussion of hearsay. The perspective is reflected in virtually every casebook, treatise, and law review article on
the subject ....
The perspective is also reflected by the omission of any consideration of the confrontation clause in the instruction and scholarship
of Constitutional Law by constitutional specialists. Despite the terms
of the clause guaranteeing a specific right to accused persons, and
despite its location within the Bill of Rights, no constitutional
scholar since pre-Wigmore writers Black and Cooley has included a
discussion of the clause in a constitutional treatise or casebook.
Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.

295, 341 (1981).
61. In a strong argument, Howard Gutman contends that evidence law has
taken primacy over confrontation law because legal educators and scholars have
placed study of the confrontation clause in the evidence field. He notes that while
early nineteenth century scholars studied the confrontation clause as part of constitutional law, John Henry Wigmore changed this by analyzing confrontation as
part of evidence law. Id. at 332-43. Gutman notes:
In his attempt to provide the first intellectual and systematic analysis
of the clause, Wigmore pondered how the clause affects established
trial procedure and the admissibility of evidence and how the Constitution relates to the use of hearsay. .

.

.Thus, Wigmore inter-

preted the confrontation clause according to the law of evidence.
Consequently, the scope of the clause was to be determined by the
same policy considerations that govern the pursuit of correct trial
results in evidence law-reliability and necessity.
Id. at 340-41. Wigmore's approach, which was not compelled by the then existing
cases, id. at 338, has controlled case law with few modifications ever since:
"Courts at all levels have analyzed the confrontation clause purely from an evi-
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The Court's decisions are controlled by the proposition
that "the Confrontation Clause's very mission [is] to advance 'the accuracy of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials.' "62 This notion has become so ingrained in
confrontation jurisprudence that it has been accepted without reflection by all nine members of the Court. Thus, the
Inadi court split on whether verdicts were more or less accurate if an unavailability rule were applied to coconspirator
statements, but both majority and dissent expressly noted
that the purpose of the confrontation clause is to further accuracy in fact-finding. Seven Justices concluded, "The admission of coconspirators' declarations into evidence thus
dentiary perspective focusing on reliability and necessity and permitting the admission of evidence falling within traditional hearsay exceptions." Id. at 335
n.204. Aspects of Wigmore's position have been challenged, but the critics generally agree that confrontation's goal is "to foster reliability and to accommodate
necessity .... " Id. at 337. These critics only reaffirm Wigmore's approach of
analyzing confrontation by evidence principles and help to assure confrontation's
subordination to hearsay doctrine. Gutman concludes:
The longevity and dominance of Wigmore's words, first recorded in
1899, can be explained by his ability, albeit unintended, to avoid
constitutionally-focused substantive criticism. Wigmore's power lay
not in the answer he provided, but in the questions he asked, the way
he characterized the issue, and the perspective which he provided.
Id. at 340.
62. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (quoting Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)); see also Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2063:
On one level, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal
justice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness
prevails.... The Confrontation Clause advances these goals by ensuring that convictions will not be based on the charges of unseen
and unknown-and hence unchallengeable-individuals.
But the confrontation guarantee serves not only symbolic goals.
The right to confront and to cross-examine witnesses is primarily a
functional right that promotes reliability in criminal trials.
The Court equated reliability promotion with "this truth finding function of
the Confrontation Clause .. " Id. Compare Graham, The Right of Co'frontation and
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 132-33
(1972):
Logic may not suffice to properly delimit the right of confrontation. There is a strong element of folk justice, gut fairness, or adversary sportsmanship involved in the confrontation notion .... The
idea that one who accuses another of wrong ought to do so in a
forum where he assumes the consequences of his statement has sufficient power that no amount of cynical sneering about the utility of
the oath, incidence of perjury prosecutions, or the value of crossexamination will suffice to overcome it as an important symbol of
fairness.
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actually furthers the 'Confrontation Clause's very mission'

which is to 'advance "the accuracy of the truth-determining
process in criminal trials."' "63 The two dissenters, moreover, stated that the coconspirator's presence at trial "will
contribute to the accuracy of the factfinding enterprise, the
accuracy that is the primary concern of the Confrontation
Clause." 64
As long as the confrontation clause is interpreted with
advancing the accuracy of the truth-determining process as
its prime purpose, the sixth amendment provision will be
subordinated to evidentiary principles. This subordination
occurs because the confrontation clause, according to the
Court's premise, will seek no goal not already sought by evidence rules. Evidence law exists to serve "the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."-65 Although evidence law may have subsidiary purposes, its prime goal is to advance the accuracy of the courts'
fact finding function. Thus, the chief missions of the confrontation clause and evidence law coincide. Consequently,
if evidence rules are thought to serve their own goals, they
will also be thought to further confrontation's goals and pass
constitutional muster, and modern evidence rules will naturally appear to further accuracy.
Our present evidence law is the product of common law
generations, study by legal giants, many reform efforts, and
much recent codification guided by scholars, judges, attorneys, and legislators. These efforts have been undertaken to
strengthen the truth-determining process of trials. While
63. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1127 (1986) (quoting Tennessee
v. Street, 471 U.S. at 415).
64. Id. at 1133 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
65. FED. R. EVID. 102; see also Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for
Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 241-43 (1966):
Once the judicial framework has been established, [an evidence
code] draftsman must strike a balance among the goals desirable and
achievable within that framework. Truth finding must be a central
purpose whatever the tribunal. Unless we are to assume that the
substantive law is perverse or irrelevant to the public welfare, then
its enforcement is properly the primary aim of litigation: and the
substantive law can be best enforced if litigation results in accurate
determinations of facts made material by the applicable rule of law.
Unless reasonably accurate fact finding is assumed, there does not
appear to be any sound basis for our judicial system.
Id. at 243.
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disputes about certain provisions may occur, any rule that
has survived all this evidentiary analysis can be thought to
serve the purpose of making verdicts more accurate. Since
confrontation analysis has been scanty compared to that in
the evidence field, a court should naturally defer to accumulated evidentiary wisdom when asked if evidence furthers
confrontation's mission-does it aid the truth-determination
process of criminal trials? If the Court has correctly identified confrontation's purpose, the confrontation clause is an
anachronism. Modern evidence law has made it outmoded.
This result, however, depends on the Court having correctly identified the confrontation clause's purpose. Its conclusion does not get support from anything that can be
divined about the Framers' original intentions. 6 6 Indeed,
the Court has only recently asserted that accurate truth-determination is the confrontation clause's mission, a determination which abandons long-accepted views about the
provision's core. The Court's first identification of the
clause's purpose was different:
The primary object of the constitutional provision
...was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ...
being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which
the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives
67
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Here, in its initial discussion of purpose, the Court identified not only what the clause aims to prevent, but also what
it seeks to provide and why. The clause prohibits ex parte
affidavits. Confrontation is satisfied by direct and cross-examination in front of the jury. These examinations are protected so that the jury can assess the believability of the
witness. A testing function in front of thejury was originally
seen at the clause's core. This was stressed by other early
66. See supra note 46.
67. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).

1988]

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

579

confrontation cases, 6 8 and the concern continued in the first
69
of the modern decisions interpreting the provision.
The shift away from this long-recognized purpose, however, soon began. In Dutton v. Evans the plurality pronounced,
The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission
of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a
satisfactory 7 0basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement.'
This formulation of the provision's core purpose eliminated eight decades of language that stressed the importance of testimony in front of the jury, and replaced it with a
new core goal: the practical concern for accurate truth-determination. 7 ' The transformation became complete in Tennessee v. Street, which dropped from its explanation of
confrontation's purpose any mention that information was
68. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899):

But a fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved against an accused ...

except by witnesses who con-

front him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried,
whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may
impeach in every mode authorized by the established rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal cases.
See also Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911).
69. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965) (stating that "a major reason underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant
charged with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.");
see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) ("The right to confrontation...
includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to
weigh the demeanor of the witness."); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418
(1965) ("Our cases construing the clause hold that a primary interest secured by it
is the right of cross-examination .... ).
70. 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161
(1970)).
71. Although quoting California v. Green, Evans' statement was a departure
from the Green holding. In determining whether prior statements of a testifying
witness could be used as substantive evidence, the Green Court first quoted the
Mattox formulation and stated, "Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to
conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's
out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination." California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
Green listed no purpose for the confrontation clause that had not been given by
Mattox, and Evans ignored Green's reliance upon cross-examination in front of the
jury. Indeed, Evans's quote from Green significantly abridges it. More fully, Green
states, "[S]ubsequent cross-examination at the defendant's trial will still afford the
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." Id.
at 161.

580

UCLA LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 35:557

to be presented so that the jury could weigh the credibility
of the witness. Instead, the Court ruled, the provision's mission is only to further accuracy in truth-determination. As
seen above, all members of the Court have now subscribed
to that statement of purpose. 72
At first glance, the confrontation clause's present goal
may seem to be little different from the original one of preserving personal examination in front of the jury so that the
jurors can judge the believability of the witness. Parties
challenge trial testimony so that juries can accurately determine the facts. Therefore, it may appear that evidence that
advances accurate truth-determination will be consistent
with the original statement of the clause's purpose, and the
Court's present enunciation of the provision's mission is just
a reformulation without a change in meaning.
The transformation, however, is more than mere semantics. As shown above, one result is that the accepted primary purpose for confrontation now coincides with the
central object of evidence law. This causes the constitutional provision's subordination to evidence law. 7 3

A further consequence also flows from the change.
While originally the constitutional provision's purpose
granted an accused the right to test evidence so a jury could
assess it, the confrontation clause now no longer specifically
protects the accused. According to the Court, this constitutional provision merely grants the defendant the right to the
most accurate truth-determining process. Granting the defendant this right allows him nothing not given the prosecution. The prosecution's only legitimate desire in a criminal
trial is to achieve the best truth-determination. The government's stake and the accused's stake in confrontation are
now precisely the same. In asserting his confrontation rights
the defendant is no longer claiming a protection from the
prosecution, but is seeking exactly what the prosecution can
also claim.7 4 The confrontation clause, in spite of its actual
72. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
73. See supra text accompanying note 65.
74. Professor Bandes argues:
that the state cannot claim to represent the accused's rights. The
state can, of course, represent its own interests, but these must be
weighed on their own merits, and not be imbued with the borrowed
weight of those of the accused. The state's interests are distinct
from the accused's interests.
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words extending a right to the accused, 75 no longer expressly safeguards the accused. Instead, it is a protection
which everyone in society, as represented by the prosecutor,
can demand. In other words, the accused has no need for
this constitutional protection because the accused and the
prosecution should always be on the same side of every confrontation question. If the Court's assessment of the
clause's mission is correct, the confrontation clause can no
longer be understood as a right protecting the accused.
B.

Confrontation as an Adversary Right

Confrontation is meaningless as a fundamental right
if it has the mission the Court ascribes to it. The Court,
however, has divined this purpose for the clause by examining it in isolation. It has not drawn on analysis from other
constitutional provisions to shape its conclusion. The confrontation clause, however, does not sit by itself in the Constitution. It has a context; it is but one provision of the sixth
amendment. If the clause is interpreted in that context, as
part of the sixth amendment, a different mission for the
clause is apparent.
Indeed, while the Court's confrontation cases have interpreted that clause separately from its sixth amendment
surroundings, other sixth amendment decisions recognize
that the confrontation protection interrelates to the right to
counsel, notice, and compulsory process provisions. These
rights, taken together as they ought to be, prescribe that a
Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1019, 1045 (1987). She notes, "The Constitution makes no mention of
the state's right to a fair or impartial trial." Id. at 1022-23. She contends that any
interest of the state must be carefully defined, and then a strict scrutiny test must
be employed to see if the state interest outweighs the constitutional rights of an
accused.
Cf Note, supra note 46, at 1304 (footnotes omitted):
Any such public policy limitations on the confrontation clause
should be read narrowly, however, only being permitted to prevail if
the substance of the individual right otherwise has been satisfied.
Focusing on the interests of parties other than the defendant makes
it easier for a court to deemphasize the individual rights at stake and
permit them to yield to other considerations. Such a result ignores
the primary role of the confrontation clause as a guarantor of the
rights of defendants against potential abuses of discretion by
prosecutors.
75. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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criminal trial is to be an adversary proceeding where the accused has the right to defend himself. As the Supreme
Court stated in interpreting the right to counsel clause:
The Sixth Amendment includes a compact statement
of the rights necessary to a full defense . .

.

. [T]hese

rights are basic to our adversary system of criminal justice .... The rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process, when taken together, guarantee that a
criminal charge may be answered in a manner now considered fundamental to the fair administration of American justice-through the calling and interrogation of
favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse
witnesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence. In
short, the Amendment constitution alizes the right in an
adversary
criminal trial to make a defense as we know
76
it.

In other words, the right to notice, counsel, confrontation,
and compulsory process are specific components of the fundamental guarantee to an accused that he can defend himself through our adversary system.VV
These rights fit together because they all seek to guarantee the same aspect of a fundamentally fair criminal proceeding, that is, that "a fair trial is one in which evidence
subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tri76. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist and ChiefJustice Burger, while dissenting from the holding in Faretta,
agreed that the sixth amendment constitutionalizes adversary criminal trials. Id.
at 847-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Comment, Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right to Preparea Defense, 56 GEO. L.J. 939, 939 (1968) ("The sixth

amendment, however, protects the basic adversary character of the Anglo-American judicial system; the right of an accused 'to be confronted with the witnesses
against him' is fundamental to his effective participation as an adversary.").
77. A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and
an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in
court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him,
to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)(footnote omitted); see also Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965)(quoting Oliver); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
294 (1973)(quoting Oliver). Chambers also stated:
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's
accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses
and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized
as essential to due process.
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bunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the
7
proceeding.' 8
This collection of rights can be separated from the
other sixth amendment guarantees. The rights to a public, a
speedy, and a jury trial are essential to our notions of fairness, but they do not interrelate like the remaining sixth
amendment rights.7 9 A secret trial can still be speedy and
decided by a jury. A bench trial can be open, and so on.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of these rights is not dependent on the amendment's adversarial provisions since the
rights could be effectuated in inquisitorial proceedings as
well. Similarly, an adversary process does not necessarily require a jury, a public, or a speedy trial.
On the other hand, the adversary system, while it can be
separated from these other guarantees, is not assured simply
by the grant of any one component right. It is dependent on
the simultaneous functioning of the rights of notice, counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process.8 0 Defense
counsel is necessary for the fair conduct of an adversarial
trial, 8' but an adversarial trial would still be denied if that
counsel could not present favorable witnesses or test adverse evidence. Granting the accused the opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses can be meaningless if the accused
does not have skilled counsel conduct the questioning.8 2 An
accused can be granted a compulsory process right, but we
do not have our adversary system if the accused does not
also have the right to confront adverse witnesses.8 3 All the
rights assuring the adversary process must be read together
78. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
79. The sixth amendment as a whole does have the unitary purpose of protecting specific components of a fair trial. "The Constitution guarantees a fair
trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair
trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment .
Id. at
684-85.
80. Cf. Westen, The Compulsoiy Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 73, 179 (1974)
("All of the various procedural rights in the Bill of Rights are implicitly designed
to strengthen the adversary posture of the accused. Indeed, in pursuit of their
common end they overlap and complement one another.") (footnote omitted).
81. "In an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel." Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S.
333, 341 (1978).
82. "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
68-69 (1932).
83. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967):
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for the adversary system constitutionalized by the sixth
amendment to exist, and put simply, as the Court has, "the
adversarial process [is] protected by the Sixth Amendment
.... 84 For the sixth amendment to serve its mission, then,
the focus of its notice, confrontation, compulsory process,
and assistance of counsel clauses must all be the same-pre85
serving and advancing the adversary system.
That role of the confrontation clause must be kept in
mind if the clause is to be properly interpreted. Its purpose
can easily be misunderstood. Because confrontation is bundled with other sixth amendment rights to guarantee an accused an adversarial criminal proceeding,8 6 it becomes easy
to confuse confrontation's goal with our faith in the adversary system. We employ the adversary system because we
87
believe that the system is a good way to ascertain the truth.
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense .... Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he
has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.
This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.
84. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984); cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("[A] fair trial is one in which evidence subject
to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues
defined in advance of the proceeding.").
85. Cf. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsoy Process: A Unified Theor , of Evidence
for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 569 (1978) ("neither confrontation nor
compulsory process can be meaningfully understood without reference to the
companion provision.").
86. Cf Lilly, supra note 2, at 211-12:
The confrontation provisions of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
and, subsequently, of the sixth amendment were intended to prevent
the perceived abuses of the civil law procedure. The accused's constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses provided security
against the inquisitional practice of examining witnesses in closed
chambers ....
The drafters of the sixth amendment [may have] ...
simply wanted to insure adherence to the common law adversarial
system.
87. "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853, 862 (1975); see also Morgan, learsay )Dangers
and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 185 (1948) ("The theory of the system is that in the
contest between the parties, each interested to demonstrate the strength of his
own contentions and to expose the weakness of his opponent's, the truth will
emerge."); Traynor, Ground Lost and found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
228, 228 (1964) ("The plea for the adversary system is that it elicits a reasonable
approximation of the truth.").
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This belief apparently leads to the conclusion that the confrontation clause is satisfied as long as the prosecution's
presentation of evidence makes the truth-determining process more accurate. This logical leap, however, simply ignores the actual scheme of the sixth amendment. The rights
of notice, counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process
constitutionalize the adversary system, and while we presume truth comes out of this system, the converging sixth
amendment protections guarantee neither accurate determinations nor even the most reliable way to ascertain the facts.
Instead, the accused is guaranteed an adversary criminal
trial even if that is not the best truth-determining process for
him. 88 Just as the state cannot deny an accused ajury trial by
establishing that a nonjury trial was the better way to determine the facts, 89 the accused cannot be denied an adversary
criminal trial even if an inquisitorial proceeding would have
determined the truth better in the accused's case.
Neither a defendant nor society is given the sixth
amendment right to the best truth-determining process.
The amendment only guarantees the accused one particular
process-a public, speedy,jury trial where the defendant has
the right to the adversarial testing and presentation of evidence, where the defendant has the right to notice, counsel,
confrontation, and compulsory process. Thus, while confrontation, in its service to the adversary system, may concomitantly
advance
the
truth-determining
process,
confrontation's mission, like the mission of other sixth
amendment rights, is to help guarantee the adversary sys88. Cf Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1036 (1975) (footnote omitted):

We proclaim to each other and to the world that the clash of adversaries is a powerful means for hammering out the truth ....

That the

adversary technique is useful within limits none will doubt. That it is
"best" we should all doubt if we were able to be objective about the
question. Despite our untested statements of self-congratulation,
we know that others searching after facts-in history, geography,
medicine, whatever-do not emulate our adversary system. We
know that most countries of the world seek justice by different
routes. What is much more to the point, we know that many of the
rules and devices of adversary litigation as we conduct it are not
geared for, but are often aptly suited to defeat, the development of
the truth.
89. Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (holding that while an accused has a sixth amendment right to a jury trial, the accused does not have the
correlative constitutional right to waive a jury).
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tem. The advancement of the accuracy of the truth-determining process is merely the incidental benefit from
confrontation's real purpose of guaranteeing the adversary
system as set forth in the sixth amendment.
Consequently, when deciding whether confrontation or
one of the other rights protecting the adversary system is
violated, the courts should not ask whether the claimed violation directly promotes or hinders the accuracy of the verdict. Instead, the courts must determine whether the
disputed practice unconstitutionally infringes on our adversary system. 90 That determination can be made properly
only if confrontation's role in our adversary system is
understood.
C.

Confrontation's Role in the Adversary System

Confrontation's role in the adversary system is clear.
Confrontation allows for the adversarial testing of evidence.
A fundamental principle of our adversary system maintains
that a factfinder should normally not rely on the words of a
witness until the opponent has had the chance to test and
challenge that witness's abilities to narrate the truth. Crossexamination is, of course, the tool used to test and challenge, and is therefore a core component of an adversary
system which grants the accused the right to cross-examine
the state's witnesses. 9 ' The confrontation clause is the pro90. This point has been recognized in the right to counsel area. If counsel is
denied, the courts do not ask whether the truth-determination process was better
without counsel than it would have been with one. Instead, because counsel's
assistance is essential to the functioning of the adversary system, denial of counsel
requires a reversal without inquiry into the accuracy of the result. United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). When the question is whether counsel performed effectively, "the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process
.... "Id. at 657 n.21. This is because "[t]he right to the effective assistance of
counsel is ...the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing." Id. at 656.
91. "The adversary system's real genius, the heart of the concept, lies in the
use and perfection of cross-examination. The central philosophy is that by testing
the statements of one against the questions of an adversary the factfinder may
determine the truth." Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And How It
Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227, 268 (1968).
The drafters of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, for
which Edmund M. Morgan was the reporter, stated that the civil law "remains an
inquisitorial rather than an adversary system. It does not know anything like the
Anglo-American cross-examination .... [T]he opportunity for cross-examination
is not a necessary element of a jury system, while it is the very heart of an adver-

1988]

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

587

vision that secures this for the accused, as the Supreme
Court has recognized time and again. 92 Consequently, when
the prosecution is permitted to introduce evidence without
an opportunity for cross-examination, a conflict with the
fundamental foundation of the adversary system and with
the confrontation clause is apparent. On the face of the situation, a breakdown of the adversary system has occurred.
Without doubt, if the accused were totally denied the chance
to cross-examine during a trial, we would not have an adversary system as we recognize it. 93 The proper question for

confrontation is: When, if ever, does the introduction of evidence without the opportunity for the accused's cross-examination not cause an unconstitutional malfunctioning of the
adversary system?
That question cannot be answered without an understanding of the purpose of cross-examination in our adversary system. Cross-examination's central role is not to make
evidence reliable. 94 Instead, the adversary is given the opportunity to test and challenge the evidence in front of the
95
jury so that the jury will have all the information necessary
sary theory of litigation." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE ch. VI introductory note
(1942).
See also Read, supra note 46, at 49 ("[Clross-examination is the core component to be preserved [by the confrontation clause]-because it is essential to our
adversary system .... ).
92. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) ("Confrontation means
more than being allowed to confront the witness physically. 'Our cases construing
the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of
cross-examination.' Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)"); Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) ("It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise
of the right of cross-examination."); see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,
18-19 (1985); Note, supra note 46, at 1302: "The most important guarantor of the
confrontation right has long been held to be cross-examination."
93. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1966) (holding that complete denial of cross-examination violates the confrontation clause).
94. "All trial testimony is not trustworthy; ajury is commonly presented with
contradictory trial declarations. Cross-examination does not invariably provide
assurances that the testimony is reliable or trustworthy, but instead presents information to the jurors so they can properly assess the testimony." Jonakait, supra
note 22, at 466.
95. [Cross-examination's] function is not merely to confuse or harass
adverse witnesses, but to develop the whole truth, which does not
always fully appear from the testimony of a witness on his examination in chief. Facts may be omitted, without any wrongful intent,
which give an entirely different appearance to the case. Or, if feeling
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96
to best assess what weight the evidence should be given.
Consequently, if the jury can properly evaluate the evidence
without cross-examination, its absence prejudices no one.
The accused, however, is not adversely affected by all
misevaluations of the evidence. He is only harmed when the
jury weighs evidence more strongly against him than it
should have. He cannot complain if the error favors him. If
cross-examination would not have led the jury to weigh the
evidence more favorably to the accused, the jury cannot misweigh the evidence to his detriment because of the denial of
cross-examination. The lack of cross-examination in this circumstance does not prejudice the accused. Therefore, no
confrontation violation has occurred.
Moreover, the mere possibility of harm from the denial
of cross-examination does not result in a confrontation violation. Confrontation must be interpreted as part of the
package of adversary rights, and those other provisions indicate that the confrontation guarantee is not an absolute one.
or interest colors the evidence of a witness, whether intentionally or
not, this can often be made to appear.
Robertson v. Heath, 132 Ga. 310, 312, 64 S.E. 73, 73 (1909) (Robertson was overruled on different grounds in Camp v. Camp, 213 Ga. 65, 69, 97 S.E.2d 125
(1957). Camp, however, explicitly reaffirmed Robertson's reasoning quoted above).
96. The Supreme Court has recognized this: "Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony
are tested." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 316; accord Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct.
2658, 2663-64 (1987). Davis went on to hold that a state rule preventing crossexamination about the bias of the prosecution's witness violated the confrontation
right: "[D]efense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the
facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." 415 U.S. at 318; cf.
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause is
generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe
and expose infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention
of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony.").
A classic work on cross-examination gives a good description of its role in our
adversary system.
It needs but the simple statement of the nature of cross-examination
to demonstrate its indispensable character in all trials of questions of
fact. No cause reaches the stage of litigation unless there are two
sides to it. If the witnesses on one side deny or qualify the statements made by those on the other, which side is telling the truth? ...
The opinions of which side are warped by prejudice or blinded by
ignorance? Which side has had the power or opportunity of correct
observation? How shall we tell, how make it apparent to a jury of
disinterested men who are to decide between the litigants? Obviously, by the means of cross-examination.
F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROss-ExAMINATION 21 (Legal Classics ed. 1983).

1988]

CONFRONTATION CLA USE

589

The sixth amendment does not prevent the remotest possibility that the factfinder will incorrectly assess the evidence
to the defendant's prejudice. Instead, it protects against a
reasonable probability or reasonable likelihood of that happening.9 7 Thus, an infringement of the confrontation clause
occurs when as a result of the accused being denied the opportunity to cross-examine, a reasonable probability exists
that the judge or jury misweighed the evidence to the ac98
cused's detriment.
97. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984) (holding that
ineffective assistance of counsel only violates the sixth amendment when there is a
"reasonable probability" that the unprofessional conduct prejudiced the accused); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873-74 (1982) (holding
that the sixth amendment compulsory process clause is violated by the deportation of witnesses only when there isa "reasonable likelihood" that the loss of
evidence prejudiced the accused).
98. Implicit in this statement is that a confrontation violation does not occur
by the mere denial of cross-examination, but only when the denial has harmed the
accused. This is consistent with the rules governing other adversary rights. Thus,
the sixth amendment is not violated by all incompetent counsel, but rather when
the ineffective assistance of the counsel has harmed the accused.
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does
not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if
the error had no effect on the judgment.... The purpose of the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant
has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the
proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance
must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective
assistance under the Constitution.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 691-92. See also United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867-69, where the Court, in deciding a compulsory process claim, analyzed various provisions of the sixth amendment and concluded, "Thus, other interests protected by the Sixth Amendment look to the
degree of prejudice incurred by a defendant as a result of governmental action or
inaction." Id. at 869. The Court held that the compulsory process clause was
violated by the deportation of witnesses only if the defendant could show that he
was negatively affected by the government's action. Id. at 871. Similarly, since
cross-examination is granted to allow the jury to evaluate the evidence, the confrontation clause is only violated if that purpose has been harmed.
For some sixth amendment areas, the prejudice is presumed to be so likely
and great that convictions are reversed without a showing of prejudice. See
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-62 (1984), for a discussion of some of
those areas. If this were the rule for confrontation, a reversal would result every
time out-of-court statements were admitted without the opportunity for the accused's cross-examination. No court or commentator has suggested that this
would be the proper result. All believe that at least some of the time statements
which have not been cross-examined can be admitted without violating the sixth
amendment. "It is all but universally assumed that there are circumstances that
excuse compliance with the right of confrontation." Graham, supra note 62, at
107-08; see also Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rnles, and Due ProcessA lroposalfor Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L.
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While this standard defines a confrontation violation, it
does not explain where the burden of proof that a violation
has occurred should lie. General principles about burdens
and interpretations of other adversary rights, however, indicate that the prosecution should have to carry the burden of
proof on the likelihood ofjury misevaluation. The Supreme
Court has held that the defendant shoulders the burden for
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 99 but these claims
differ significantly from confrontation disputes. On the one
hand, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel invariably
arise after a guilty verdict. Thejudgnent based on that verdict is presumptively correct. Our normal rules state that
the party trying to upset a final judgment has the burden of
establishing the need for the reversal. 00 The ineffectiveness
standard in giving the defendant the burden of proving prejudice merely follows this path. A confrontation claim, on
REV. 529, 539 (1974) ("The other polar view of confrontation-that it requires in
all cases an opportunity for cross-examination at trial-by implication excludes all
hearsay. This view is clearly incorrect."); Westen, supra note 85, at 615 ("Surely
there are some kinds of evidence, such as business records and statements from
learned treatises, that should be admissible in hearsay or documentary form without violating the confrontation clause.").
Confrontation is like ineffective assistance claims in that it requires a prejudice inquiry. However, there are also some important differences. To win an ineffectiveness claim, the defendant must first show that his counsel's performance
was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. Since on the face of the
situation the defendant had counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment, no
violation is apparent. Until it is established that counsel performed poorly, there
is no reason to explore further a possible constitutional violation. When the accused establishes that counsel's performance was deficient, however, the possibility of a violation of the sixth amendment is apparent and further inquiries are
justified.
Confrontation claims differ because the potential constitutional violation is
apparent on the record. The confrontation clause assumes that the defendant will
have the opportunity to challenge and test evidence against him through crossexamination. Every time the prosecution enters an out-of-court statement without the accused being afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, there is an apparent conflict with the basic mandate of this provision. In contrast to a
defendant making ineffectiveness claims, the accused has to show nothing more
than what appears on the record to gain a further inquiry into whether the Constitution has been violated. Roberts, in effect, recognized this by setting up a framework for determining the constitutionality of every piece of prosecution hearsay.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
99. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694.
100. Cf. R. MARTINEAU, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN APPELLATE ADVOCACY
§ 7.21, at 132 (1985) ("The appellant will have to show that not only is there a
factual or legal basis for his argument, but under the applicable standard of review
he is entitled to prevail.").
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the other hand, is lodged before the verdict. The judge
must rule on the confrontation claim during the evidencetaking. Thus, in contrast to ineffectiveness claims, the presumption of a judgment's regularity cannot justify placing
the burden of proving prejudice on the confrontation
claimant.
Compulsory process claims, however, should also arise
before the verdict is rendered, when the accused objects
during evidence-taking that witnesses he desires have not
been produced. Even so, the Supreme Court has held that
the defense has to establish the existence of prejudice to win
such claims.10 Even if this is the correct decision, it does not
mean that the burdens should be the same for the confrontation clause for, once again, confrontation claims differ significantly.
Compulsory process does not guarantee the defendant
the attendance of all witnesses; instead it guarantees him
process "for obtaining witnesses in his favor."' 10 2 When the
defendant claims that he should have been allowed to produce a witness, he is attempting to land within the sixth
amendment. He makes it only if the missing witness was
favorable to him. The information concerning the favorableness of the unproduced witness will not be in the record.
Ordinarily the defendant is in a better position than the
prosecutor to establish the importance of that witness, since
the defendant should have a good idea of the content of the
witness's testimony.
This makes compulsory process much like ineffective
assistance claims. The sixth amendment rights of the defendant who had an attorney have been presumptively satisfied. The right to counsel provision should only grant relief
if the lawyer was truly ineffective. The incompetence, however, may not appear in the record. If it does not appear,
the defendant is in a better position than the prosecutor to
show the incompetence of the defense attorney. Since both
the compulsory process and ineffective assistance claimant
are trying to get within the boundaries of the sixth amendment when no violation is apparent on the record, and both
are more likely than the prosecution to possess the relevant
101.
102.

United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 870-71.
For a discussion of this sixth amendment requirement, see id. at 867.
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information, both should have the burden of establishing
that a violation occurred.
In contrast, since the confrontation clause presumes
that the accused will normally have the opportunity to test
and challenge the adverse evidence, every time the prosecution introduces evidence without giving the accused an opportunity for cross-examination, the state has presumptively
violated the sixth amendment. Unlike compulsory process
and ineffective assistance claims, no one has to show that the
situation is within the sixth amendment domain. That is
clear from the record. The question is not whether there is
reason to believe that the confrontation clause has been violated, but whether there is a reason why the normal constitutional rule should not apply. In other words, the
prosecutor is seeking an exemption from the general constitutional mandate, and the party seeking an exception from a
general rule should bear the burden of establishing the requisites for an exception.1 ° 3
Moreover, unlike defendants making compulsory process and ineffectiveness claims, the accused should not have
the burden of showing prejudice because he does not have
better access than the prosecutor to the relevant information. A defendant will seldom have the information to prove
the effects that nonexistent cross-examination would have
had if it had occurred. Indeed, since the Constitution grants
no general right of pretrial discovery,1 0 4 the defendant may
103. See W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 10.3, at 458 (1985)
("Various principles are often advanced in the course of discussions of where, as a
matter of sound policy, the burden of proof should lie in various circumstances.
In summary, they are: . . . (2)that the burdens should be placed 'on the party
desiring change ... "); see also Dutile, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Comment on the Mullaney-Patterson Doctrine, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 380, 385 (1980)
(concluding that a factor in deciding where burdens should lie in criminal trials
should be, "Is the state setting the defendant's conduct out as an exception or is
the defendant singling himself out as an exception?").
104. "There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 54:9 (1977); cf. Pennsylvania v.
....
Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987). There, a defendant charged with sexual offenses
claimed a denial of confrontation because he was not allowed pretrial discovery of
an investigative report prepared by a state agency. The plurality opinion by Justice Powell, writing for himself and three others, concluded, "The opinions of this
The ability to
Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right ....
question adverse witnesses ... does not include the power to require the pretrial
disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony." Id. at 999. Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the result,
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learn about the disputed evidence only when it is presented
in court. The prosecution will be in a much better position
than the defense to present information about the possible
effects of cross-examination. Since the party with the better
access to the information should have the burden,10 5 the
prosecutor should have the burden of showing that the lack
of confrontation did not prejudice the defendant. Thus, because confrontation claims arise before a final judgment, because the prosecutor is seeking exemption from the normal
constitutional rule that appears to have been violated, and
because the prosecutor has better access to the relevant information, the prosecutor has the burden of establishing the
lack of prejudice when he introduces evidence without affording the opportunity for the accused to cross-examine.
Finally, the correct confrontation standard limits the
prejudice analysis to the evidence which has not been crossexamined. The confrontation clause protects the specific aspect of the adversary system that gives the defendant the
right to test and challenge the prosecution's witnesses. Its
denial, therefore, will only directly affect how the jury assesses the evidence that the accused could not confront.
This the Supreme Court has recognized. It has rejected
the argument that an accused must show a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been different to establish a confrontation clause violation. Instead,
the focus of the Confrontation Clause is on the individual
witnesses.... It would be a contradiction in terms to conclude that a defendant denied any opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses against him nonetheless had been
afforded his right to 'confront[ation]' because use0 6of that
right would not have affected the jury's verdict.'
In other words, the Court correctly refused to import
the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel into the
confrontation area.' 07 The right to counsel is a protection
stated that he substantially agreed with Justices Brennan and Marshall, who con-

cluded that the deprivation of important impeachment material violated the confrontation clause. Id. at 1004, 1006. The other two justices dissented on
procedural grounds.
105. See W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 103; § 10.3, at 458.
106. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986).
107. That standard requires a reasonable probability that the proceeding's outcome would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94
(1984).
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for the entire adversary process. It aids the accused in the
exercise not only of his constitutional confrontation and
compulsory process rights, but in every portion of the trial
including jury selection, opening statements, evidentiary rulings, and summations. Ineffective counsel, therefore, can affect any part of the trial, and one searching for its effect
should scour the entire proceeding. A confrontation denial,
on the other hand, does not have these direct, far-reaching
consequences. It only affects the jury's evaluation of the unconfronted witness. An inquiry into prejudicial effect of a
confrontation denial, therefore, does not extend to all aspects of the trial,' 08 but is limited to analyzing how the lack
of cross-examination affects the jury's assessment of the particular evidence.10 9
In summary, then, confrontation is an adversarial right
that protects the accused from the incorrect assessment of
evidence by granting him the right to cross-examine wit108. A standard that considers the effect on the entire trial can only be ascertained when all the evidence has been presented. That, of course, does not present a problem for a reviewing court which makes an ineffective assistance ruling
when all evidence-gathering is over. The trial judge, however, has to make the
confrontation ruling during the trial, when the ineffectiveness standard is unworkable. If the confrontation clause were only violated when the outcome of the case
is affected, the trial judge could not make a ruling when the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence without affording defense cross-examination. The
court, however, has to resolve the situation before the case's outcome is determined. The court has to decide whether to admit the evidence, and that decision
decides the constitutional question. A confrontation prejudice standard that
looks to the trial's outcome is just unworkable.
109. This does not mean to say that all cases should be reversed just because
the admission of unconfronted evidence caused prejudice. The confrontation
clause may be violated, but that error, in light of the entire case, might still be
harmless. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1438 (holding that a confrontation violation resulting from an improper restriction of the cross-examination of
an in-court witness was subject to a harmless error analysis).
Professor Kirkpatrick contends that the centrality of the hearsay should be a
factor in determining whether the confrontation clause requires the production of
available witnesses. "Cross-examination is less significant in circumstances in
which the hearsay relates only to minor, collateral, or undisputed issues, or is
merely cumulative evidence on a point already well established by other evidence." Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 683. This approach looks at the entire trial to
determine whether confrontation rights were violated, instead of focusing on the
unconfronted evidence as required. It also uses a harmless error analysis, rather
than a confrontation clause analysis. Of course, if the evidence is so peripheral
that it was not expected to have an effect on the jury, the prosecution would not
have introduced it. Indeed, the prosecution in arguing for Kirkpatrick's approach
is really arguing for having its cake and eating it, too: "I want the evidence admitted, but I tell you it's really not important."
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nesses. Therefore, the confrontation clause is violated when
denial of cross-examination gives rise to a reasonable
probability that the accused's cross-examination would have
led the jury to weigh the evidence more favorably to him." 10
110. This approach, unlike the Court's, grants the protection of the confrontation clause to the accused; the provision is not merely a right given equally to all
in society to get the most accurate verdicts or the best trial process. Potential
violations are measured from the accused's vantage, not from society's. Cf. Westen, supra note 80, at 156: "The high standard required by the confrontation
clause for incriminating hearsay arises from a specific right of the accused." This
point makes this approach not only consistent with the other adversary rights, but
also with the other sixth amendment guarantees, which grant protections to the
accused and not rights to society. For example, the sixth amendment guarantees
the criminal defendant a jury even though a jury trial may not be the most accurate way to determine facts. As Justice Harlan maintained, "Untrained jurors are
presumably less adept at reaching accurate conclusions of fact than judges ...
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Jury trials are guaranteed to protect the accused from governmental oppression. The jury trial clause reflects "a profound judgment about the way in which
law should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government." Id. at
155; accord Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978). Juries prevent governmental oppression by assuring that criminal verdicts will reflect the community's
sense ofjustice. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 n.7 (1975). While governmental oppression is prevented when the jury accurately determines the facts of
an unfounded charge, honest, unbiased, conscientious judges would also serve
this function. Compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 156. "Those who wrote
our constitutions knew from history and experience that [a jury trial] was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies
and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority."
No matter how good the judges may be, judicial determination does not permit the community to participate in criminal verdicts as juries do. The Constitution seeks to make sure that juries will represent the community by having its
verdicts be the product of group deliberation free from outside intimidation. The
decisions of such a body will reflect the community's sense of justice.
That sense was deemed important because it would not always be the same as
that of a judge or another governmental power. Instead, the jury's sense ofjustice
was expected to be more favorable to the accused than the entrenched power's
notion of justice, thereby serving as a shield against governmental oppression.
The Supreme Court has noted that juries generally reach sound verdicts and "that
when juries differ with the result at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the purposes for which they were created
and for which they are now employed." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 157.
The Court was referring to Kalven and Zeisel's research that showed when juries
differed with judges, juries generally favored defendants. H. KALVN, JR. & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY (1966). We have juries because as an institution they
are more likely than other factfinders to resolve evidence questions in the defendant's favor and because they may exercise the community's sense of justice to
acquit a defendant even when the legal facts say he is guilty. We have juries not
because they are the most accurate truth-determining process. We know they
make "mistakes," but we expect those mistakes usually to favor defendants. The
jury clause principally exists not to protect the general public, but to protect a
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And since the burden of proof on this question properly lies
with the prosecution, the prosecutor has to establish that no
such reasonable probability exists.'
III.

THE PROPER CONFRONTATION STANDARD AND ITS
APPLICATION TO HEARSAY DECLARANTS

A.

Unconfronted Statements Without Prejudice to the Accused

Until now, courts and commentators analyzing confrontation claims have, in essence, asked what hearsay best
serves the goals of evidence law. If confrontation is to take
its rightful place in the sixth amendment, we need instead to
determine when in-court cross-examination of the prosecution's out-of-court declarant is inconsequential from the defendant's perspective."12
defendant from an unjust conviction. Like the confrontation clause, it is a right
granted to the accused, not to society.
111. In a recent case, the Court came close to identifying the correct factors
when it considered a claim that confrontation was violated not by the admission of
statements from an absent declarant, but because the defendant was excluded
from a hearing to determine whether prosecution witnesses were competent to
testify. The Court concluded, "Instead of attempting to characterize a competency hearing as a trial or pretrial proceeding, it is more useful to consider
whether excluding the defendant from the hearing interferes with his opportunity
for effective cross-examination." Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664
(1987). The Court, however, has not applied this standard to the admission of
hearsay statements such as coconspirator declarations. Compare a commentator's
test for when restrictions on in-court cross-examination are constitutional:
"[C]onstitutionally protected cross-examination has been precluded by a particular restriction unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) that the defendant
would have been convicted without the witness' testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness' testimony." Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's
Favor. The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1473 (1975).
112. As this path of inquiry indicates, the protections of the confrontation
clause are not defined by an evidence law's definition of hearsay. This is as it
should be since confrontation is a constitutional right, not merely an evidence
rule. The sixth amendment question is not whether the evidence falls outside the
prevailing evidence law's notion of hearsay, but whether cross-examination of the
absent declarant might have affected the weight of the evidence. Compare Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 707 n.214 ("In some cases ... statements of coconspirators
are not hearsay at all, but verbal acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. When the
coconspirator's statements are not being offered to prove the truth of what is asserted, the confrontation clause should not affect their admissibility.").
Often, of course, when a statement is not hearsay, such cross-examination
could not have affected the jury's assessment of the evidence. For example, the
disputed evidence in Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985), was the reading to
the jury of an accomplice's confession. That occurred after the defendant testified
that his own confession given to the sheriff was coerced and derived from the
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Such analysis has not yet been done. There are, however, three categories of evidence which would not run afoul
of the sixth amendment: statements that still allow the jury
to weigh the evidence correctly; statements where cross-examination of the declarant is unlikely to produce information that would make the jury weigh the statement more
favorably to the defendant; and statements that are so reliable that the misevaluation of them could only favor the accused. Some examples will illustrate these categories.
accomplice's confession also given to the sheriff. On rebuttal, the sheriff read the
accomplice's confession to the jury for the purpose of showing the differences
between the confessions and thereby undercutting the notion that defendant's
statements were derived from the previous admissions.
Used this way, the out-of-court statements did not violate the confrontation
clause. Cross-examination of the accomplice could not have affected the weight to
be given his confession as a rebuttal for the claim that the defendant's confession
was derived from it. Such cross-examination might have tended to clarify ambiguities in the out-of-court statements, to show that the statements were not true, or
to show that the statements were not even made, but none of this would have
affected the jury's assessment of the evidence for the purpose for which it was
introduced. The important fact for determining whether the defendant's confession was coercively derived from the accomplice's was the content of the confession the sheriff claimed to have obtained from the accomplice. Since the sheriff
testified subject to cross-examination to what the accomplice said, there was confrontation on that issue.
The evidence did not violate the confrontation clause because it fell outside a
hearsay definition, but because there was no reasonable probability that crossexamination of the declarant would have led the jury to weigh the out-of-court
statements more favorably for the defense. See-Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426 (6th
Cir. 1983). There, in ajoint trial, letters written by a codefendant soliciting a false
alibi for the codefendant and the defendant were introduced. The court first undertook an extended analysis to determine whether the letters were hearsay. After noting that Wigmore apparently would not have labeled them hearsay, id. at
432, the court continued, "Although we consider the question of the proper classification of the letters exceedingly close, . . . we conclude that the letters are
hearsay ....
Id. at 433. Only after this conclusion was reached did the court
conclude that the defendant's confrontation rights were violated. See also United
States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983) (the court first analyzed out-ofcourt statements finding that their implied assertions made them hearsay and only
then found a sixth amendment violation).
See also Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Quandaryfor Federal Courts, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 741, 766-69 (1986), which discusses United

States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980). Although Zenni concluded that
out-of-court statements were not hearsay and consequently undertook no confrontation analysis, Professor Seidelson demonstrates that cross-examination of
the declarant could have affected the weight of the evidence and that the confrontation clause was implicated by the admission of the evidence.
For mere matters of convenience, the term "hearsay" is used in this Article to
mean all out-of-court statements.
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1. Former Testimony
Former testimony falls into the first category of statements that still allow the jury to weigh the evidence correctly. If the prior testimony was taken under circumstances
giving the accused the opportunity for full cross-examination, when he had the same interest in testing the evidence
as he would have had at trial, and when he had comparable
information to prepare as he would have had at trial, then
cross-examination at trial is unlikely to lead the jury to weigh
the declarant's evidence differently. If this assertion is correct, former testimony can be admitted without infringing
on our adversary system generally or confrontation's specific
role within it.
The determination of whether former testimony can be
constitutionally admitted, however, requires a much closer
scrutiny of the prior proceeding than has been done by
courts reviewing confrontation claims. The Supreme Court
has never barred former testimony because of the nature of
the prior proceeding. Such hearsay has been admitted even
when there were quite different incentives to cross-examine
in the prior proceeding than those produced by a trial." 3
Under an evidentiary approach to former testimony,
these differences may not matter. The hearsay prohibition
exists because hearsay cannot be properly evaluated; the
testing of the declarant's abilities to narrate the truth has not
occurred. Former testimony, however, differs from ordinary
hearsay because it has been subjected to the accused's challenge and, therefore, can be evaluated better than hearsay
generally. Even when the different nature of the prior proceeding causes some restrictions on the cross-examination
or produces less of a reason for full cross-examination, the
trial jury may still be able to evaluate the former testimony
much better than other hearsay, and the former testimony
can be admissible under evidence law.
The sixth amendment, however, does not measure outof-court statements against other out-of-court statements.
Instead, it compares the ability of the jury to evaluate such a
statement with its ability to evaluate the statement if it had
been presented at trial subjet to the accused's cross-examination. For confrontation purposes, it does not matter that
113. See infra text accompanying note 118.
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some hearsay can be evaluated better than other hearsay.
All that matters is whether the hearsay can be assessed as
4
well as in-court testimony.' "
With this point in mind, it should be evident that the
former testimony that most readily satisfies the confrontation clause is testimony from the accused's prior trial on the
same issue. At the prior trial, the accused had the full opportunity and the same interest to test and challenge the witness on the issues as at the present trial. Therefore, the
hearsay evidence is comparable to what would have been
presented at trial." 5 Consequently, there is little reason to
believe that an additional confrontation will much benefit
the accused." 16
114. Former testimony illustrates the weakness of the evidentiary approach to
confrontation which focuses on the reliability of the hearsay. The Court's conclusion that former testimony can be constitutionally admitted because of its reliability is not defensible. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67-70 (1980); Mancusi
v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972). Just as in-court testimony is not reliable, but
can be evaluated by the jury, see supra note 94, former testimony can only be constitutionally admitted because of the jury's ability to evaluate it.
Indeed, if an oath and cross-examination made testimony reliable, then prior
testimony should be admissible no matter who the parties were at the former proceeding. If the accused's cross-examination makes a witness' testimony so reliable
that it can be admitted against the accused in a subsequent trial, then the prior
testimony should also be admissible in other actions such as a codefendant's separate trial. That, however, is not permitted. The reliable testimony will be seen as
unreliable when introduced into the codefendant's trial. Since the evidence remains the same, this makes no sense. Instead, these correct results are based intuitively on the proper rationale; that is, that the prior testimony is admissible
against the accused because when the accused has had the prior opportunity to
test and challenge the hearsay it is not likely to be subsequently mistakenly
weighed to his detriment. When the prosecution seeks to introduce the evidence
against the codefendant who did not have that chance, even though the reliability
of the hearsay remains the same, we cannot be so confident that the evidence will
not be mistakenly weighed to the codefendant's detriment. Therefore, the evidence is not constitutionally admissible. See, e.g., Mattes v. Gagnon, 700 F.2d
1096, 1101-04 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that it violated the defendant's confrontation rights to introduce testimony from another trial where the defendant was not
a party).
115. Compare Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (finding no
confrontation violation from the admission of testimony from the prior trial of the
accused. "The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of
subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination.").
116. This conclusion is also a conclusion that the witness's demeanor in front
of the trier of fact is unlikely to lead the jury to assess the evidence more favorably
to the defendant. Such a conclusion is necessary if any unconfronted statements
are to be admitted, and seems justifiable when the hearsay includes a full crossexamination of the witness. Compare State v. Anthony, 448 A.2d 744 (R.I. 1982).
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While this result should hold true for testimony from a
prior trial on the same issues, testimony produced at other
hearings presents more difficulties. Such prior testimony
can be constitutionally admitted only when it can reasonably
be expected to present the jury with practically the same information as would direct and cross-examination at the present trial. Only then is it reasonable to believe that the jury
will not mistakenly weigh the hearsay to the accused's
detriment.
Such confidence can only come from proceedings where
a reasonable attorney for the accused would have thoroughly explored the now contested issue and in fact would
have been allowed to do so by the court.1 1 7 When these conditions are met, the information developed at the proceeding should be so comparable to trial testimony that it can be
constitutionally admitted.
In assessing the constitutional admissibility of prior testimony, the Supreme Court, however, has decided that testiThere, the declarant testified at a pretrial hearing implicating the accused. He
refused to testify at the trial, the hearsay was admitted, and the accused was convicted. Four years later, the declarant testified at a new trial, stated that he previously lied, and confessed that he committed the crime. The reviewing court
concluded
that any assessment of Fairhurst's conflicting testimony based upon
a cold record, even with the benefit of hindsight, is at best very difficult. Of course, evaluating a witness's credibility from a dispassionate record is a problem inherent in almost any prior recorded
testimony....
Our comment is offered merely to highlight the importance of
live testimony so that the trier of fact can assess a witness's credibility on the basis of demeanor as well as the testimony.
Id. at 753; also comparejones v. United States, 441 A.2d. 1004, 1006 (D.C. 1982),
where after a declarant refused to testify, his former testimony, which had been
tape-recorded, was introduced: "In this case, the jury could monitor Smith's demeanor by listening to the tape recording of his voice while answering questions
propounded to him at the first trial. It also saw him on the stand, refusing to
testify."
117. Cf Martin, The Former-Testimony Exception in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 IowA L. REV. 547, 556, 559 (1972), who contends that for former testimony under the evidence rules the
crucial question is whether, given that the opponent can not now
cross-examine the witness, the examination on the prior occasion
was fairly equivalent to cross-examination in the present situation ....

It is unfair to hold a party to the former examination if no

reasonable attorney would be expected to have elicited the now-relevant facts; but if the circumstances were such that those facts could
have been brought out if they were available, the present opponent
can be fairly held.
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mony is admissible if the hearing that produced it merely
had trappings similar to a trial. Thus, California v. Green, the
first decision to uphold the constitutionality of the admission
of preliminary hearing testimony, concluded that the declarant's "statement at the preliminary hearing had already been
given under circumstances closely approximating those that
surround the typical trial .... [W]e do not find the instant

preliminary hearing significantly different from an actual
trial to warrant distinguishing the two cases for purposes of
the Confrontation Clause." 1 18
While the Court was correct in noting that the hearing
had some of the accoutrements of a trial, the Court did not
decide the correct question of whether a reasonable attorney
would have produced substantially the same cross-examination as at trial. Such cross-examination can seldom be produced in the preliminary hearing. As one court recognized
in deciding that such hearing testimony was not admissible:
The hearing was not one where a motive existed to
develop testimony as one would have in a trial. The appellants were represented by attorneys but were not obligated to cross-examine the witness. To presume that
they should have done so would be to presume that they
knew the testimony could be used later in the absence of
the witness. That would mean a preliminary hearing
could not be one solely to learn if only probable cause
existed. It is questionable whether there is even a right
to conduct a searching cross-examination at a preliminary hearing. Moreover, a defendant, having no obligation to cross-examine, may for strategy's sake forego
examination. The defense may not wish to disclose its
theory of defense.' 19
118. 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970). The Court noted, "Porter was under oath; respondent was represented by counsel .. .; respondent had every opportunity to
cross-examine Porter as to his statement; and the proceedings were conducted
before a judicial tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of the hearings."

Id.
119. Scott v. State, 272 Ark. 88, 612 S.W.2d 110, 113 (1981); see also California
v. Green, 399 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting), giving substantially the same
reasons for why -[c]ross-examination at the hearing pales beside that which takes
place at trial."
It is interesting to note one court's response when a defendant sought to
introduce preliminary hearing testimony:
As a practical matter, a prosecutor cannot reasonably be expected
always to use a preliminary hearing to elicit answers not needed at
the preliminary hearing, simply because he should anticipate the wit-
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There may be justifications in evidence law to admit prior
hearing testimony, since such testimony can be evaluated
better than other hearsay. Prior hearing testimony, however, generally will not satisfy the confrontation clause as
20
correctly interpreted. 1
Even if the previous proceeding is the kind at which a
reasonable attorney would have fully explored the now contested issue, the former testimony cannot be constitutionally
admitted if the attorney was not permitted that full exploration. Former testimony can only be admitted when the jury
would not have weighed the evidence differently from trial
testimony. Therefore, preliminary hearing restrictions that
prevent testimony from yielding the same information as
would be yielded by in-court testimony make that hearsay
constitutionally inadmissible in criminal trials. Certainly,
when a court has specifically prevented questions at a preliminary hearing which would be permissible at trial, the
preliminary hearing testimony cannot satisfy the confronta2
tion clause.' '
ness will later be unavailable. If the state is to be held to this, we
might as well have two full dress trials ...
(The defendant] zeroes in on the state's assertion that it did not
have a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Sanders. Why, it had
all the opportunity in the world! This of course assumes the state
should have foreseen that Sanders would be unavailable for the trial,
and should have taken the time of a no doubt busy court to build up
a record in anticipation of that possibility.
United States ex rel. Bracey v. Fairman, 712 F.2d 315, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1983).
120. Some preliminary hearing testimony should be constitutionally admissible. Thus, if the accused moves prior to trial to suppress admissions as involuntarily given, the testimony adduced at that hearing could be admissible at trial on
the issue of whether the statements were made voluntarily.
121. United States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1088 (1981), presents an example of how application of existing confrontation principles can lead to the admission of former testimony that clearly
should have been excluded by the sixth amendment. There, preliminary hearing
testimony was used to convict the defendant in state court even though his counsel was specifically prevented from asking questions that would have shed light on
many relevant subjects, including the declarant's background, credibility, and
ability to identify the accused. While the Seventh Circuit conceded that similar
restrictions at trial probably would have violated the confrontation clause and due
process and been reversible state error, the court held that the preliminary hearing testimony was admitted without violating the confrontation clause. The sixth
amendment was satisfied because the
test for determining whether preliminary hearing testimony is admissible under the Confrontation Clause, as with all hearsay, is not
whether there was an opportunity for full and complete cross-examination, but whether there are adequate indicia of reliability to justify
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In summary, former testimony can be admitted without
violating the confrontation clause, but its admission cannot
be just a routine matter. Instead, the proceeding which produced the hearsay must be analyzed to see if it is reasonable
to conclude that the former testimony will be weighed
against the defendant in the same way as if the declarant
its placement before the jury, even though there is no contemporaneous confrontation of the declarant.
Id. at 463.
This result might make sense under evidence law. There was cross-examination at the preliminary hearing so the hearsay could be evaluated better than hearsay generally; thus, the former testimony might justifiably be exempted from
evidence's hearsay ban. To say, however, that evidence can be admitted in the
form of prior testimony when its introduction as in-court testimony would have
violated the defendant's rights makes no sense. The Seventh Circuit cited Alford
v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931), for its conclusion that the hearing's crossexamination restrictions would have violated the Constitution if imposed at trial.
658 F.2d at 461. In Alford, the Court unanimously held that the defendant's rights
were violated when he was prevented from asking at trial where a prosecution
witness lived. The court concluded that cross-examination's
permissible purposes, among others, are that the witness may be
identified with his community so that independent testimony may be
sought and offered of his reputation for veracity in his own neighborhood ....
that the jury may interpret his testimony in the light
reflected upon it by knowledge of his environment ....
and that facts
may be brought out tending to discredit the witness by showing that
his testimony in chief was untrue or biased.
282 U.S. at 691-92.
In other words, restrictions on cross-examination like that imposed in Alford
cannot be placed at trial because it may prevent the accused from having the jury
correctly assess the evidence. If the in-court testimony cannot be properly evaluated because of the restriction, surely the evidence cannot be better weighed
when it takes the less desirable hearsay form. The confrontation clause exists not
as a turnstile to admit more reliable hearsay than hearsay generally, but to allow
the accused the adversarial testing of evidence so that the jury will not unfairly
weigh the evidence against him.
Other courts have followed Haywood in allowing the admission of preliminary
hearing testimony even though the accused was prevented from cross-examining
on crucial topics. See, e.g., State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 325 N.W.2d 857, 864
(1982) (holding that the introduction of preliminary hearing testimony did not
violate the confrontation clause even though the accused was prohibited from
cross-examining on "an important issue" in the case).
A related situation occurs when cross-examination at the hearing cannot be
as extensive as it would have been at trial because investigation and discovery that
occurs by trial has not been completed at the hearing. When this occurs, it is not
reasonable to conclude that the hearsay will be evaluated no more harshly for the
defendant than the trial testimony. But see Gonzalez v. Scully, 578 F. Supp. 1063,
1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), where the court found that the admission of preliminary
hearing testimony did not violate the sixth amendment although material impeaching a witness was turned over only after the hearing. The court concluded,
"Preliminary hearing testimony is per se reliable as long as the witness testifying
was subject to cross examination." Id.
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were confronted at the present trial. Hearsay from trials on
the same issue should be admissible while that from pretrial
hearings seldom will pass sixth amendment scrutiny.
Prosecutors may complain about this interpretation,
concluding that it will make it impossible to win convictions
when key witnesses cannot be produced at trial. That, however, need not be the result. Testimony from a hearing
should not offend confrontation principles where the defense has been notified that the proceeding's purpose is to
preserve evidence for trial and where the defense is given
full opportunity for cross-examination after completing discovery. Prosecutors may wish to avoid such hearings to prevent disclosure of their evidence and theories in advance of
trial. The present interpretation of the confrontation clause,
however, places that risk of disclosure on the accused. Since
there is a chance that the preliminary hearing testimony will
be used at trial, a defendant's attorney should cross-examine
a witness as extensively as he can at the hearing. In doing
so, of course, he may divulge strategies, information, and
defenses. Furthermore, the hearing testimony may be admitted even if the accused's attempt at full cross-examination is thwarted by hearing court limitations or by his own
inability to do a thorough investigation before the hearing.
In other words, although our adversary system is supposed
to provide protection for the accused, the Court's present
interpretation of the former testimony rule often protects
the prosecution at the expense of the accused, which proper
interpretation should not allow.
2.

Business Records

Out-of-court statements can be admitted when they
consist of information that can be correctly interpreted by
the jury. They can also be admitted when cross-examination
of the declarant at trial would be unlikely to produce useful
evidence for the proper assessment of the statement. In
such a circumstance, since trial testimony will not produce
additional helpful information, the out-of-court statement
will not be mistakenly weighed to the defendant's detriment
because of the absence of cross-examination. The truly routine business record, such as a bank teller's notation that the
defendant made a deposit, or employment records showing
that he was not at his assembly line job, serve as examples.
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If such evidence is introduced with opportunity for
cross-examination of the declarant by the defense, the court
must determine whether cross-examination of the teller
might have led the jury to assess the bank record more favorably for the accused. If the recording was truly routine,
done with little reflection as were other recordings, then the
teller is unlikely to remember anything about this transaction. 12 2 If forced to testify, all he could relate would be the
procedures for record-making and record-keeping. When
the records are made and kept under an established system
that requires little personal judgment by the teller, he can be
no more helpful for the jury's assessment of the evidence
than the custodian of the record can be. Cross-examination
of the teller will accomplish nothing more for the accused
than cross-examination of the custodian. As long as the custodian is produced and can be cross-examined about the
routine of record creation and preservation, the hearsay can
1 23
be constitutionally admitted.
This does not mean that all business records admissible
under evidence law can be constitutionally introduced. Evidence law only demands that the record be made and kept in
the ordinary course of business, that it be made at or near
the time of the event, and that it not have been made in circumstances indicating untrustworthiness. 24 The confrontation clause looks at the issues from the defendant's
viewpoint and asks when the cross-examination of the business declarant might affect evaluation of the hearsay. Hearsay can satisfy the business records hearsay exception and
still fail to satisfy the sixth amendment. For example, when
the declarant should remember a regularly recorded and
maintained but nonroutine event, the accused's cross-exami122. See infra note 125.
123. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 698-99 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970)):
Records of regularly conducted activity also tend to lack susceptibility to testing by cross-examination because the declarant's recollection of the matter recorded will frequently be less trustworthy
than the record itself. Occasionally, cross-examination of the witness who establishes the foundation for the records, or another witness familiar with the recording process will provide the trier of fact
with "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement" that is a constitutionally adequate substitute for cross-examination of the declarant.
124. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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25
nation may change the jury's perception of the evidence.
When the statement records the declarant's individual expertise or judgment, cross-examination about the declarant's standards in his exercise of opinions and judgments,
even though he may not remember the event, may make the
126
jury view the hearsay more favorably for the accused.
Consequently, such hearsay cannot be introduced without
cross-examination of the declarant.
125. Cf. Note, Hearsayand the ConfrontationGuaranty, 38 LA. L. REV. 858, 866-67
(1978):
Business records are reliable because they are recorded in the daily
course of business by a trained entrant, checked by systematic balance-striking, and relied upon as the basis for future business activity. This reliability, combined with the probability that the entrant, if
he can be identified, will not recall the transaction among the hundred he has handled, makes the requirement of proof of unavailability impractical. A coroner's report is not made subject to these
conditions which insure reliability. A coroner must make subjective
conclusions which only he can best explain. Additionally, the examining coroner is identifiable and he is likely to remember the specific
examination.
126. See, e.g., United States v. McClintock, 784 F.2d 1278, 1292 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985) (holding that the admission of routine gemstone
grading reports violated the confrontation clause. "[B]ecause of the various
means of evaluation and apparent subjective decisions that enter into the evaluation of gems, McClintock's confrontation of the preparers of the reports may have
been valuable to his defense."); Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing
Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against CriminalDefendants, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 621, 639
(1979):
When the subject of the report is evaluative, equally qualified experts in the field will often reach conflicting opinions on the very
same facts. Precedent and principle compel the conclusions that
there is too great a likelihood that a lay trier of fact will generally be
unable to determine the proper weight to assign to an evaluative
opinion in a police laboratory report if they do not have the opportunity to have the expert cross-examined.
See also Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1209 n.92
(1979):
The prosecution is not required to produce the author of business
records, because ordinarily the prosecutor can reasonably assume
that the defendant would not wish to examine the author of the
records in person ....
To be sure, some business records contain
evaluative statements that the defendant can reasonably be expected
to wish to examine; in that event, the confrontation clause would
require the prosecution to produce the maker of the records in
person.
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Reliable Statements

Finally, reliable out-of-court statements can be admitted
consistently with the confrontation clause, but the level of
reliability must be qualitatively different from that accepted
by evidence law for a hearsay exception. Just because evidence has the reliability of a hearsay exception does not
mean that the statement cannot be mistakenly weighed to
the accused's detriment. Evidence law may admit an out-ofcourt statement when the circumstances of its utterance
lessen the chances of insincerity or a mistaken perception or
memory. 127 While such hearsay may be more reliable than
hearsay generally, the lessened chance of mistake does not
guarantee that the accused's cross-examination of the declarant would not have helped his case. 128 The hearsay, for
127. See Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV.

1786, 1796-97 (1980):
Current analyses are unpersuasive even in their attempts to
identify which categories of hearsay are reliable. The reliability of
hearsay is usually determined by examining the degree to which be-

lieving the evidence requires unsupported reliance upon the declarant's four testimonial capacities: narration, sincerity, memory, and
perception. If circumstances indicate that no danger would result
from reliance upon one or more of these capacities, an exception is
sometimes said to be warranted. Yet it is not clear why the hearsay
problem is "solved" when only one or two of the four defects have
been removed.
128. On numerous occasions the [Federal Rules of Evidence] Advisory
Committee, in keeping with tradition, finds justification for admitting out-of-court statements, either by excepting them from the
hearsay rule or by excluding them from the definition of hearsay, on
the assumption that under the circumstances the declarant would
not lie. Accuracy of perception and memory receive less attention in
determining admissibility, even though errors and distortion in perception and memory are probably the most important source of testimonial conflict.
Stewart, Perception, AIemory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed
FederalRules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 9. See Morgan, supra note 87, at 188
("While cross-examination can and occasionally does reveal insincerity and peculiarities in the use of language, experience in the courtroom demonstrates that its
most important service is in exposing faults in perception and memory."); see also
Graham, supra note 62, at 136:
[N]one of the factors supposed to give some classes of hearsay a special reliability have ever been empirically demonstrated to have the
effects on accuracy attributed to them, and some actually have been
proved to negate rather than enhance reliability. Since this justification for the use of hearsay did not develop until later, it is doubtful
that the drafters of the Sixth Amendment envisaged confrontation
being satisfied by anything other than cross-examination: in the presence of the jury.
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example, may have little chance of being a lie, but cross-examination may reveal that the statement could have been the
product of a distorted perception and still incorrect. The
out-of-court statement, because of the lessened sincerity
problem, may be reliable enough for a hearsay exception,
but not for the sixth amendment since defense cross-examination of the declarant may have aided the accused. Instead,
to satisfy the confrontation clause, the statement has to be so
trustworthy that it must be accurate. Thus, any jury misevaluation of such a statement introduced against the defendant without cross-examination will have to be in the
defendant's favor. The only possible way to mistakenly
weigh the statement would be to give it less weight than it
29
deserves. That can only harm the prosecution's case.'
Supreme Court opinions have occasionally come close
to affirming this correct approach. For example, dicta in
Mattox v. United States acknowledged the constitutionality of
dying declarations. 30 The Court seemed to say that this
conclusion was required simply because dying declarations
were accepted at the time of the Constitution's adoption. 31
The Court, however, also went on to indicate that dying declarations are so accurate that an accused's confrontation interests cannot be harmed by their admission: "[T]he sense
of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to
falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth
as would the obligation of an oath."'' 32 The Court was accepting the traditional rationale for that hearsay exception's
existence: a person does not die with a lie on his lips.

133

129. Cf Note, supra note 46, at 1304 ("[T]he admission of coconspirator statements solely on the basis of their presumptive reliability would pose no confrontation clause problem as long as the statements are inherently so trustworthy that
cross-examination would be superfluous.").
130. Dying declarations "from time immemorial
have been treated as competent testimony, and no one would have the hardihood at this day to question
their admissibility." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
131. We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law
as it existed at the time it was adopted .... Many of its provisions in

the nature of a Bill of Rights are subject to exceptions, recognized
long before the adoption of the Constitution, and not interfering at
all with its spirit. Such exceptions were obviously intended to be
respected.
Id. at 243.
132. Id. at 244.
133. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 454 Pa. 515, 517-18, 314 A.2d 224, 225
(1973) (quoting Lush, L.J., in Regina v. Osman, 15 Cox Cr. Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. 1881))
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Thus, the Court seems to be indicating that such evidence
was so reliable that it could not be mistakenly weighed to the
defendant's disadvantage any more than in-court testimony
could be.
Language in Dutton v. Evans comes even closer to the
mark. Although the plurality opinion seemed to combine a
number of reasons for concluding that a coconspirator's
declaration was admissible, the opinion finally concluded,
"The possibility that cross-examination of Williams could
conceivably have shown the jury that the statement, though
'3 4
made, might have been unreliable was wholly unreal."'
This statement essentially announces a correct standard.
Hearsay can be admitted without confrontation if the accused's cross-examination could not have led the jury to assess the evidence more favorably to the accused.
That these courts may have come close to enunciating
the right approach does not mean, however, that their conclusions were correct. Even if the rationale for dying declarations is accepted, it only tends to insure that the declarant
was not intending to mislead when he made the pronouncement. It guarantees nothing about the accuracy of the declarant's perception, and since modern studies indicate that
stress warps perception, there are reasons to doubt the accu1
racy of a dying declaration.

35

Similarly, Dutton v. Evans may have announced a correct
standard without reaching a correct result. There, the declarant stated to a fellow prisoner: "If it hadn't been for that
dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this
(basing the reliability of a dying declaration upon the classic statement that no
one "who is immediately going into the presence of his Maker will do so with a lie
upon his lips.").
134. 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
135. Cf. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 30, at 483:
[C]ountervailing factors exist which suggest [a dying declaration's]
unreliability. Chief among these is the probability that the declarant
will have been under great stress before, during and after the homicidal attack. Stress . . . interferes with accurate perception and can
lead to memory or narration problems. Yet stress may not be the
threat to perception in this area that it is in others. The most significant of the facts commonly proved by dying declarations, the identity of a previously known killer, seems unlikely to be either
misperceived or forgotten. Where the declarant describes the circumstances of the homicide, the more detailed the account, the
greater the threat posed by problems of perception.
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now."' 136 This statement was introduced "because the jury
was being invited to infer that Williams had implicitly identified Evans as the perpetrator of the murder when he blamed
Evans for his predicament." 1 3 7 If this meaning is what Williams intended by his assertion, then the Court may have
been right in concluding that the assertion was so unlikely to
have been the product of a faulty memory or mistaken perception or insincerity that cross-examination would not have
altered its weight. It is not clear from the statement, however, that Williams intended to assert that Evans was the
murderer. The statement was ambiguous, and cross-examination may well have shown that it had a different meaning.13 8 In-court testimony, therefore, may well have
convinced the jury that the statement was not as damaging
to the accused as first thought. In other words, while the
Court's words approached the correct standard, that standard was not employed. The hearsay was admitted simply
because some of the hearsay dangers were reduced even
though the statement was not so reliable that it could not be
39
mistakenly weighed to the accused's disadvantage.1
The Court's present analysis, of course, does not even
attempt to apply the proper standard. Instead, the Court
136. 400 U.S. at 77.
137. Id. at 88.
138. In dissent,Justice Marshalljoined by three others, said about the conclusion that cross-examination would not have had an effect:
A trial lawyer might well doubt, as an article of skeptical faith of that
profession, such a categorical prophecy about the likely results of
careful cross-examination. . . . At his trial Evans himself gave unsworn testimony to the effect that the murder prosecution might
have arisen from enmities that Evans' own law enforcement activities
had stirred up in the locality. Did Williams' accusation relate to Evans as a man with powerful and unscrupulous enemies, or Evans as a
murderer? Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion opts for the latter interpretation .... But at this great distance from events, no one can be
certain. The point is that absent cross-examination of Williams himself, the jury was left with only the unelucidated, apparently damning, and patently damaging accusation ....
Id. at 103-04 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Indeed, a majority of the Court found that
cross-examination of the declarant may have made a difference. Justice Harlan
who concurred in the result, but not injustice Stewart's opinion, stated that Justice Marshall had satisfactorily rebutted the claim that cross-examination would
not have mattered. Id. at 93-94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
139. See Davenport, supra note 52, at 1390: "Absent sufficient inherent assurances of reliability, the only permissible guarantor of the hearsay declaration's
evidentiary value is the defendant's cross-examination."
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only requires an evidentiary analysis to determine whether
the usual hearsay rules have been employed. 140 Thus, instead of grappling with the difficult and crucial question of
what effect cross-examination might have had in assessing
the weight of a declarant's words, confrontation analysis is
now only concerned with the arcanum of hearsay exceptions.
As long as this approach continues, criminal defendants will
not get the full protection of the confrontation clause. 14 1
B.

The Unavailable Declarant

In its confrontation analyses, the Court has not only incorrectly indicated the kind of hearsay that can be admitted,
but also incorrectly asserted that some hearsay otherwise
constitutionally inadmissible becomes admissible if the declarant is unavailable. 142 The proper standard, that the sixth
amendment is violated by the introduction of unconfronted
statements when cross-examination would have led to a
more favorable evaluation for the accused, indicates otherwise. Constitutionally inadmissible hearsay does not become
admissible just because the declarant is absent through no
fault of the prosecutor. Even if the declarant cannot be produced after good faith prosecutorial efforts, out-of-court
statements failing to meet the proper standard cannot be
constitutionally introduced.
At first glance, a rule that prohibits evidence from even
a dead declarant seems unduly hard on the prosecution.
Why should the state suffer when the declarant is absent
through no fault of its own? This question misses the point.
The confrontation clause is not a matter of blame. It does
not merely forbid the state from depriving the accused of the
opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant. Instead, the clause flatly grants a protection to the accused.
This is not surprising because the prejudice to the defendant
140. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
141. Whether any hearsay does have the quality of being so trustworthy that it

cannot be mistakenly weighed to the defendant's disadvantage is not easy to decide because unconfronted evidence has not yet been subjected to the proper
analysis. A continuing appropriate case-by-case analysis is now needed. From
such an analysis categories of admissible statements may eventually emerge.
142. Roberts stated that in general, declarants must be unavailable for their
statements to be admitted. See supra text accompanying note 7. hadi limits the

unavailability rule to former testimony or perhaps to Rule 804 evidence. See supra
text accompanying notes 15-38.
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from the unconfronted statements does not vary with the
reason for the declarant's unavailability. The accused is
harmed just as much by hearsay that came from a dead declarant as from a live one whom the prosecution did not
seek.'

43

This result is really no harsher for the state than what
regularly occurs. If an important prosecution witness dies
without producing admissible hearsay, that witness's evidence is lost. We do not allow the prosecution to introduce
a summary of the evidence it expected to produce simply
because it was blameless for the declarant's absence. The
fact that the declarant uttered admissible hearsay alters the
situation from confrontation's perspective only if the hearsay cannot be misevaluated to the defendant's detriment.
C.

The Available Declarant

One final situation remains: hearsay from an available,
but unproduced declarant. An analysis of this situation is
more complex than that for absent declarants. First, of
course, if the hearsay is the kind that will not be mistakenly
weighed to the accused's detriment, then the evidence may
be admitted without producing the available declarant. If
the evidence meets this standard, cross-examination will not
matter, and there is no point in requiring the prosecution to
produce the declarant. 144 Therefore, such out-of-court statements can be introduced whether or not an available declarant is produced.
143. In discussing the Court's holding that hearsay can be admitted when the
declarant is unavailable through no fault of the prosecution, Professor Kenneth
Graham notes,
[T]he Court seems to ignore the fact that in a great many cases it will
not be the 'fault' of the defendant either. In such cases one might
have supposed that the function of the confrontation clause and the constitutionally required burden of proof was to place the risk of the absence of reliable
evidence of guilt or innocence upon the state rather than the defendant.
Graham, supra note 62, at 121 (emphasis in original); cf. Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 76, 90 (1971) ("Inherent in
the [Mattox] Court's decision [to admit the former testimony of a dead declarant]
was the conclusion that the accused, rather than the prosecution, should suffer the
adverse consequences arising from the adventitious fact of the declarant's
death.").
144. "The Constitution should not compel witness' presence in the courtroom
when confrontation would not be helpful to the accused." Lilly, supra note 2, at
225.
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If the out-of-court statements are not of the kind that
satisfies the proper confrontation standard, then they cannot
be admitted without allowing the defense the opportunity
for cross-examination. Does this mean that the prosecutor
has to produce the declarant to get the evidence admitted,
or is the confrontation clause satisfied if the accused can call
the witness to the stand and examine him? 45 By holding
that the prosecutor does not have to produce the declarant
before introducing coconspirator statements, Inadi indicates
14 6
the latter rule is the correct one.
Inadi's logic is appealing: Since the defendant can put
the declarant on the stand, the defense is allowed to test and
challenge the evidence just as much as if the prosecutor had
produced the declarant. Since the same information can be
presented to the jury as if the prosecution had called the witness, the trier's evaluation of the evidence should not
change; there appears to be no reasonable probability that
the factfinder would assess the witness more favorably if the
prosecution had been required to produce him. The confrontation clause seems satisfied.
Inadi's appeal, however, is superficial. First, it sets the
sixth amendment into conflict with itself by ignoring the
wording and interpretation of the compulsory process
clause. Inadi indicates that the defendant does not have to
be confronted with the witnesses against him because under
the compulsory process clause he has a right to compel their
in-court testimony.14 7 Compulsory process, however,
merely gives the accused the right to produce favorable witnesses, not the right to produce witnesses against him. 148 In
145. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), held that hearsay can be admitted in conformity with the confrontation clause when the declarant testifies subject to cross-examination at trial.
146. See supra text accompanying note 35.
147. After noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 806 permits the adverse party
calling the declarant to examine the declarant as if under cross-examination, the
Court concluded, "The Compulsory Process Clause would have aided respondent
in obtaining the testimony of any of these declarants." United States v. Inadi, 106
S. Ct. 1121, 1128 (1986).
148. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
compulsory process for witnesses in his favor .... U.S. CONST. amend VI; see
Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 MIAMI L. REv. 19, 65 (1985):
The clause is "to be confronted with," which requires presentation
of evidence by the prosecution. The clause does not merely say "to
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its fullest explication of a compulsory process standard, the
Court held that when the government deports alien wit-

nesses, the defendant can win a compulsory process claim
only if he establishes that a potential witness's testimony
would have been favorable to him, and that such favorable
testimony would have produced a reasonable probability of
a different verdict.' 4 9 If this holding represents the correct
compulsory process standard, then the accused does not
generally have a constitutional right to compel the presence
of a person who has uttered incriminating hearsay. 50
While Inadi's logic regarding compulsory process ignored the Court's own recent decisions,' 5 1 its argument
confront" which could more easily be interpreted to mean cross-examination only.... The [compulsory process] clause is "witnesses in

his favor" which means witnesses tending to establish his innocence.
The clause does not state "witnesses against him .. "
149. Sanctions may be iinposed on the Government for deporting witnesses only if the criminal defendant makes a plausible showing that
the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material
and favorable to his defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the
testimony of available witnesses.... [S]anctions will be warranted
for deportation of alien witnesses only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the
trier of fact.
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873-74 (1982).
150. To be entitled to produce the declarant, the accused should have to show
that the cross-examination's fruits will be favorable. If, as will often be the case,
the hearsay declarant has not revealed useful information in advance of trial to the
accused or has not even talked to the defense, the defendant will not be able to
show this fact. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931):
Counsel often cannot know in advance what pertinent facts may
be elicited on cross-examination. For that reason it is necessarily
exploratory; and the rule that the examiner must indicate the purpose of his inquiry does not, in general, apply .... It is the essence

of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner,
even though he is unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable
cross-examination might develop.
See also Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354, 372, 478 A.2d 695, 704 (1984), cert.
denied,
469 U.S. 1207 (1985) ("We do not speculate as to what Moon's counsel would
seek to prove by cross-examining the witness on this point. We do take note that
trial counsel is often resourceful and ingenious in making use of the right of crossexamination."); cf.Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74 MicH. L. REV. 191, 234 (1975)
("[A] witness favors the defendant if his testimony tends to defeat an element of
the state's case, whether this is accomplished by testifying directly to the underlying events at issue or by testifying indirectly to the reliability of the state's
witnesses.").
151. This logic is also suspect because it, in effect, recognizes only one right
when the Constitution created two.
In effect, this argument holds that since the defendant has an opportunity to use compulsory process to subpoena the [declarant], he is
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about practicalities also presents difficulties. Little is to be
gained, the Court stated, by placing the significant burden of
production on the prosecution when the defendant has not
thought it important enough to produce the declarant himself. 5 2 This position misconceives the difficulty of the potential prosecutorial burden and ignores the effect of placing
the burden on the defense.
When the prosecution must produce a witness because
he has not uttered admissible hearsay, experience convincingly demonstrates that the prosecution's burdens are not
insuperable. Such witnesses are routinely put on the stand
by the government, and indeed many, if not most, prosecutions are proved successfully without hearsay from absent
declarants. When the prosecutor truly desires to produce a
53
witness in court, failure is not the rule.1
The difficulties for the government do not change
merely because a witness has produced admissible hearsay.
Indeed, it is hard to believe that the prosecution in Inadi
would have found it very difficult to produce the declarant if
it had wanted to. The government had subpoenaed the declarant, but he failed to appear, claiming car trouble. 54 In
other words, the prosecution had the wherewithal to serve
the declarant and ascertain an excuse for his nonappearance.
Without much difficulty, it had the means to produce him if
it had chosen to do so. Surely, if the government had made
a deal with the declarant to incriminate the defendant at
foreclosed from raising any confrontation or due process challenges
to the [hearsay]....
This counterargument is suspect as a matter of construction.
The sixth amendment's wording guarantees the defendant two distinct rights: confrontation and compulsory process. The counterargument virtually merges the confrontation clause into the
compulsory-process clause.
Imwinkelried, supra note 126, at 645-46 (emphasis in original).
152. Moreover, an unavailability rule places a significant practical
burden on the prosecution

....

Any marginal protection to the de-

fendant by forcing the government to call as witnesses those coconspirator declarants who are available, willing to testify, hostile to the
defense and yet not already subpoenaed by the prosecution, when
the defendant himself can call and cross-examine such declarant,
cannot support an unavailability rule.
106 S. Ct. at 1128-29.
153. "An unavailability requirement imposes no more than a minimal burden
on the prosecution in most cases." Note, supra note 46, at 1313.
154. 106 S. Ct. at 1124.
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trial, the prosecution would not have found the burden too
great to produce the declarant. The Court's concern about
the significant practical burden for the prosecutor was at
best an abstract one; it did not refer to the facts of Inadi. The
prosecution failed to produce the declarant not because it
would have been so hard to get him to the witness stand, but
simply because as a matter of strategy it chose not to.
The Court, however, did not consider the effects of its
decision on the defense. Whatever difficulty a production
burden might give the prosecution, the difficulty is even
greater for a defendant. He has all the problems encountered by the prosecutor, and then some. For example, an
accused can expect to receive less cooperation from prison
officials in producing a jailed declarant than would a prosecutor. In addition, since the ordinary defendant has fewer
resources than the state, the burden, even if it were equal for
the two sides, will be proportionately more difficult for the
defense. Moreover, the accused has no constitutional right
to discover the prosecution's incriminating evidence. 155 The
defendant, therefore, may not know that the prosecution is
relying on hearsay until it is produced. While the prosecutor
should have had time in advance of trial to produce the declarant, the defendant may get his first opportunity to search
for the declarant during the trial. Even if he then has a right
to compulsory process, it will often be useless.
Ignoring, these practicalities, the Court went on to conclude that its removal of the burden of production from the
prosecution would not cause the loss of valuable information: "[A]n unavailability rule is not likely to produce much
testimony that adds anything to the truth-determining process over and above that which would be produced without
such a rule .... Presumably only those declarant that neither

side believes will be particularly helpful will not have been
subpoenaed as witnesses."'' 56 This conclusion is simply incorrect, and the facts of Inadi itself indicate why.
According to the government, the declarant in Inadi was
an active participant in the conspiracy. This person surely
had "helpful" information; he had valuable knowledge that
155. See supra note 104.
156. 106 S. Ct. at 1127.
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confirmed or undercut the prosecution's case.1 5 7 The

Court's conclusion that this person was not produced because the jury would have found his testimony useless does
not make sense. Instead, what the Court refused to recognize is that the declarant was not produced because neither
side wanted to take the risks inherent in calling him.
The risks to the parties are apparent. Since the declarant was not under the control of either party, no one could
be sure what he would say. If, on the one hand, it had been
certain that the declarant would testify detrimentally to the
defense, the prosecution would have called him. If, on the
other, he would have testified in favor of the accused, the
defense would have had him testify. Instead, neither side
produced him because it was unclear to all how the witness
would testify or how the jury would perceive that testimony.
Although the testimony should have been useful for a
factfinder trying to ascertain the truth, neither party was
sure whether the testimony would be helpful to its case.
Each side faced the fact that while the declarant's testimony might help its position, it also might hurt. Calling him
to the stand was a gamble. Inadi relieves the prosecutor of
having to confront this risk and instead places all the risktaking burden on the defense. Since the prosecution can
present the damaging hearsay without having to chance what
the declarant will say, the prosecution will not call him. Instead, the defense is now presented with the dilemma of determining whether to let the hearsay stand uncontested or to
take the risk of calling the witness.
This dilemma is the real issue of Inadi. How does shifting this risk onto the defense affect the sixth amendment's
guarantee of our adversary system?1 58 That crucial question
157. Inadi was convicted of conspiring to manufacture and distribute
methamphetamine. He was to supply cash and chemicals for the manufacture and
distribution of the product. The declarant, an unindicted coconspirator, was
present during the manufacture. 106 S. Ct. at 1123.
158. Even under the Court's confrontation standard of deciding whether the
accuracy of the truth-determining process was advanced, Inadi is wrong. If there
are three eyewitnesses to a murder, truth-determination is better served by calling
all three eyewitnesses rather than just one. The presentation of all, not just part,
of the relevant evidence produces greater accuracy. The parties, however, might
see risks in calling everybody. For example, if neither side was able to talk with
the two witnesses before trial, the two might not be called. Time-worn admonitions tell the advocate not to call someone without knowing what he will say. In
such a situation, when the parties have not called eyewitnesses, the Court's logic
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went unaddressed by any of the Justices, but it is clear that it
changes the situation in several ways.
First, the placement of the burden on the defense to call
the witness allows the prosecution to seek a guilty verdict
without presenting information that might be harmful to its
case. It eliminates an incentive for the prosecutor to make
the fullest presentation of evidence. Since truth should be
best ascertained and the conviction of the innocent be best
prevented after reception of all the relevant, nonprejudicial
evidence, the incentive for the prosecutor to seek the truth is
passed on to the defense by forcing the defense to decide
whether or not to call the witness.
Thus, Inadi reverses firmly established roles in our adversary system which state that the prosecution, not the defense, must make sure that the trial is a search for truth. As
Justice White has explained:
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict
the guilty and to make sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be dedicated to making the criminal
suggests that since neither side produced the two witnesses, their testimony
would not have significantly aided truth determination. Common sense, however,
indicates that the testimony would have aided the jury, but no one knows which
side will be happier with the evidence.
In another example, the defendant claims self-defense in the shooting of
Smith outside a bar. At trial, he produces a bar patron who was inside the building at the time of the shooting and could not see the incident. He did hear Jones
exclaim right before the shooting, "Smith has a knife!" This statement is admitted as an excited utterance, an exception that permits the admission of evidence
without the production of an available declarant. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2). This
situation, then, is much like Inadi. Hearsay, the value of which depends on its
context, is admitted without having the declarant testify. If neither side calls the
declarant, is truth-determination as well served as by his production? Inadi says
"yes," but the question can only be answered if we know what the declarant would
have said. Thus, assume that the defense interviewed the declarant, who stated,
"Yes, I made that exclamation, but I was wrong. Immediately after the shooting I
went over to Smith. He had no knife. I don't know how I could have made such a
mistake, and the defendant was much closer to Smith than I was. If I am called at
trial, I will tell the truth. But I am defendant's friend, so I won't cooperate with
the prosecution before trial."
Knowing this, we know that calling the declarant would have aided truth determination, yet neither side might call him. The Inadi court would conclude that
both parties' failure to produce indicates that the declarant's in-court testimony
would not have aided accurate factfinding. The Court is wrong.
The testimony of the declarant in Inadi also would have helped truth-determination. The coconspirator declarant is in effect an eyewitness to the crime of conspiracy. Surely his testimony would have shed important light on the conspiracy's
membership, actions, goals, and existence. Surely his testimony would have aided
the jury.
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trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts
surrounding the commission of the crime. To this extent, our so-called adversary system is not adversary at
all; nor should it be. But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our
system assigns him a different mission. He must be and
is interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent,
but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that
he defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty. The
State has the obligation to present the evidence. Defense
counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the
truth is. 159

Under the Court's confrontation interpretation, the
prosecutor is no longer obligated to present the evidence.
In effect, the defense is coerced into doing so or suffering
the consequences of having the jury weigh the hearsay with160
out all the possible information.
Not only does Inadi's logic conflict with the prosecutor's
task of ascertaining the truth and not convicting the innocent, it also alters another accepted part of our adversary
system. Ordinarily, when the prosecution presents damaging
evidence, the defendant is given the opportunity immediately after its receipt to challenge and test the evidence
through cross-examination. Concomitantly, when the defense presents exonerating evidence, the prosecution is
given the immediate chance to cross-examine. Neither side
has to produce the adverse witness for cross-examination.
Neither side has to wait until later in the case to challenge
and test the evidence.
159. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
160. Even from the Court's viewpoint that the confrontation clause should be
interpreted to promote the accuracy of the trial process, the burden of production
should be placed on the prosecution. For accuracy, the trial should have the fullest presentation of evidence. When the defendant is presented with the dilemma
of leaving the hearsay unchallenged or calling the declarant without knowing
whether he will help or hurt his case, the defendant may choose not to call the
declarant and hope that the jury will find that guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has
not been established. He may prefer just to have some detrimental evidence, the
hearsay, admitted against him without taking the risk that further evidence, from
the declarant's testimony, might also be harmful to him. If the burden is on the
state, the declarant is more likely to be produced. To get the hearsay before the
jury, the prosecutor will have to produce the declarant, and the requirement that
the prosecution has to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt will bring pressures on him to get the hearsay admitted. Thus, placing the burden on the prosecution makes it more likely that all the relevant evidence will be introduced.
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The Inadi approach changes this scheme with regard to
hearsay from an available declarant. Now the defendant
must produce the person he wishes to confront, and he must
wait until it is his turn to produce -witnesses before he can
cross-examine. This approach suggests that our entire trial
system could be similarly restructured in such a way that the
opposing side would not be allowed to cross-examine a witness after he testifies, but would only be permitted to call the
witness and conduct cross-examination as part of its own
case. In other words, the prosecution would be allowed to
introduce all its direct examination from several witnesses
unimpeded by defense cross-examination. The defense
would then call those witnesses unimpeded by the prosecution's cross-examination. Finally, the prosecution could call
and cross-examine all the favorable defense witnesses. If
Inadi is correct, this system must be constitutional, for the
defendant gets his chance to cross-examine. The change,
however, is clearly a radical alteration in the way we conduct
trials, and one that should be found to violate the sixth

amendment. 161
161. Professor Westen has demonstrated that the right to cross-examine a
prosecution's witness right after the conclusion of his direct examination is at the
heart of the confrontation clause.
The gross order-of-proof in American criminal procedure is dictated partly by tradition and partly by constitutional compulsion.
Thus, tradition provides that as between the two sides, the prosecution presents its case first and the defendant presents his case second. In addition, however, the sixth amendment entitles a
defendant to interrupt the prosecution's case-in-chief by intervening
to elicit evidence in his defense by means of cross-examination....
indeed, the right of a defendant to interrupt the state's presentation
of evidence by cross-examining prosecution witnesses is at the core
of the sixth amendment right of confrontation.
Westen, Order of Proof: An Accused's Right to Control 'he Timing and Sequence of Evidence
in His Defense, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 934, 981-83 (1978). Westen goes on to imagine a
system without a confrontation right where the defense would have to rely on
compulsory process to present information usually elicited on cross-examination.
In that sense, the compulsory process clause already provides the
defendant with every benefit he would otherwise enjoy under the
confrontation clause, with one important exception-more effective
timing and sequence. The main (and perhaps the only) thing the
confrontation clause adds to the compulsory process clause is that it
gives a defendant the right to examine certain witnesses-i.e., those
persons whose incriminating statements the prosecution introduces
against the defendant in its case-in-chief--at the time during trial
when the statements are first made to the jury and are uppermost in
the jurors' minds. In other words, the essential attribute of the right
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Indeed, let's go further. If the defendant's confrontation rights are preserved by his ability to produce witnesses
for cross-examination, why should hearsay have to be reliable to be admitted? Direct examination does not have to be
trustworthy to be presented. Instead, the defense can crossexamine the witness to allow the jury to properly assess the
testimony. Thus, the prosecution can produce any kind of
hearsay as long as the defense can later call the declarant for
cross-examination. Inadi's logic should lead to the conclusion that the confrontation clause allows the prosecution to
produce summaries of its evidence or ex parte affidavits without calling witnesses, so long as the defense can later produce those witnesses. Surely the confrontation clause
16 2
prohibits such a result.

If these new approaches to the entire trial violate the
sixth amendment, why should these same approaches to part
of the trial be treated differently? Why should hearsay from
available declarants be treated differently from any other evidence presented by the prosecution? The simple answer is
that such hearsay should not be treated differently unless the
admission of the hearsay would not infringe the accused's
right to the adversary system guaranteed by the sixth
of confrontation is that it regulates the defendant's order-of-proof:
where the defendant would otherwise have to wait to elicit impeaching evidence as part of his own case-in-chief, the confrontation
clause allows him to interrupt the state's case-in-chief to elicit that
evidence at a time when the impeachment will be most effective.
Id. at 983. See also Westen, supra note 85, at 616 (confrontation and compulsory
process "enable the defendant to examine the witnesses whose statements are
used against him at a time when their statements are still fresh in the factfinder's
mind.").
162. "Historical evidence indicates that the Founding Fathers intended to ban
precisely this result: cases wherein the prosecution's only evidence consists of relatively formal documents such as affidavits to which the jury is likely to attach
great weight." Imwinkelried, supra note 126, at 647. See also Graham, supra note
148, at 66 (Writing shortly before Inadi, Graham states, "In this long line of decisions, there is not even the slightest hint that the sixth amendment permits the
prosecution to introduce an ex parte affidavit merely because the complaining
witness is available to be called and examined by the accused at trial."); Westen,
supra note 85, at 574-75 ("Yet it has been understood since the earliest confrontation cases that the prohibition of trials by affidavit lies at the very core of our
notions of confrontation."); cf. Davenport, supra note 52, at 1403 ("There is something innately unfair and reminiscent of trial by affidavit in a process that allows
the prosecutor to build a case with hearsay, while the defendant is forced to
scramble about and exhaust his own, often scarce resources to attempt to produce
the declarants.").
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amendment. This right is not infringed if the cross-examination of the declarant would not have aided the defense.
Only then can we be sure that a delayed cross-examination
has not radically altered our adversary system. Thus, if the
hearsay is of the quality that meets the confrontation standard, the declarant need not be produced by the prosecution to have the out-of-court statements admitted. For all
other hearsay, the declarant must be produced or the hearsay cannot be admitted.
CONCLUSION

In interpreting the confrontation clause, the Supreme
Court has misunderstood the purpose of the provision. As a
result, evidence law now controls the content of the confrontation clause, and the clause now offers an accused little protection. Correctly interpreted, the confrontation clause is
not a minor adjunct of evidence law, but is one of a bundle
of rights that assures the accused the protection of our adversary system. It assures the accused the right to the adversarial testing of the prosecution's evidence. This is granted
to assure that the jury will not overvalue the evidence
against the defendant. The confrontation clause gives the
accused the right to exclude all out-of-court statements
when the declarant is not produced except when the prosecutor establishes the lack of a reasonable probability that the
accused's cross-examination of the declarant would have led
the jury to weigh the evidence more favorably to the accused. With this proper standard, the confrontation clause
can be returned to its rightful place in the sixth amendment.

